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AFTER BOSTON MEDICAL CENTER:
WHY TEACHING ASSISTANTS SHOULD HAVE
THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
I. INTRODUCTION
At Yale University, New York University (NYU), and other pri-
vate universities, graduate students employed as teaching assistants
(TAs)l assist professors by meeting with students in discussion
groups and individually to provide tutorial assistance and by grading
exams and papers.2 Some Yale and NYU TAs even independently
develop and teach their own courses. 3 By some counts, Yale TAs are
responsible for forty percent of all classroom contact hours between
students and instructors and NYU TAs teach twenty percent of all
classes.4 Yale and NYU TAs provide these services, which would
otherwise have to be provided by a professor, at considerably less
than the cost of a professor.5 Not surprisingly, Yale University is
1. The term "teaching assistant" or "TA" covers various job categories, all
of which consist of students who are still studying towards their undergraduate
or graduate degrees and who at the same time are paid either to teach or to as-
sist in the teaching of other students. Thus defined, TAs should be contrasted
with "research assistants" or "RAs." The latter term again covers various job
categories, all of which consist of students who are also still studying towards
their undergraduate or graduate degrees but who at the same time are paid ei-
ther to conduct or to assist in the conducting of their own research or that of
others.
2. See Yale Univ., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 1999 WL 1076116, at *13 (Nov.
29, 1999); New York Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-22, E-23 (NLRB
Apr. 3, 2000).
3. See Yale Univ., 1999 WL 1076116, at *13; New York Univ., 66 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-23 to E-24.
4. See New York Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-23 n. 16; Graduate
Employees and Students Org., Casual in Blue: Yale and the Academic Labor
Market (visited Nov. 9, 1999) <http://www.yale.edu/geso/casual>.
5. See New York Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-23 nn.7-8 (NYU
TA and RA "stipends" range from $6500 to $20,000; generally, NYU TAs and
R.As do not receive insurance or retirement benefits); Douglas Sorrelle Streitz
1849
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 33:1849
increasingly relying on cheap TA labor: Whereas the number of fac-
ulty slightly decreased from 688 in 1980 to 653 in 1997, the number
of TAs sharply increased from 778 to 1039 over the same period.6
The situation is similar at other universities.
7
Despite the valuable services that TAs provide at private univer-
sities such as Yale or NYU, they have so far been denied the status
of "employees" within the meaning of the National Labor Relations
Act8 (NLRA) and, consequently, the right to bargain collectively
over their meager wages and other terms and conditions of their em-
ployment that is afforded those with this status. Concretely, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has held that students who are
employed by their university are not employees within the meaning
of the NLRA because they seek employment primarily for educa-
tional rather than economic purposes. 9 This approach has been re-
ferred to by commentators as the "primary purpose test."'
1
The period of TA disenfranchisement may, however, finally be
over. On November 26, 1999, the NLRB abandoned the old primary
purpose test and held that students who are employed by their uni-
versity are employees within the meaning of the NLRA if they
& Jennifer Allyson Hunlder, Teaching or Learning: Are Teaching Assistants
Students or Employees?, 24 J.C. & U.L. 349, 374 (1997) (employing a Yale
TA costs between $25,000 and $27,000 a year, including health and fringe
benefits, while the average tenure track professor earns $60,000 a year).
6. See Graduate Employees and Students Org., supra note 4.
7. See Stephen L. Ukeiley, Confusion at the National Labor Relations
Board: The Misapplication of Board Precedent to Resolve the Yale University
Grade-Strike, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 527, 535 n.34 (1997) (citing national
studies that indicate that graduate students teach between 50% and 60% of un-
dergraduate students).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
9. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 253 (1976) (holding that
medical house staff who are primarily students are therefore not employees);
see also St. Clare's Hosp. and Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1001-02 (1977)
(holding that student employees other than medical house staff who are pri-
marily students are likewise not employees). The term "medical housestaff'
refers to medical students who already have their medical degrees and who are
now paid to work in a teaching hospital, usually as a prerequisite for qualifying
to practice in general medicine or a medical (sub)specialty. See Cedars-Sinai,
223 N.L.R.B. at 251.
10. See, e.g., Stephen L. Sepinuck, Hospital Residents and Interns: Incon-
sistent Treatment under Federal Law, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 665, 668 (1985).
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provide compensated services.11 This new approach will be referred
to below as the "service test." Only three days after it pronounced
the service test, the NLRB remanded unfair labor practice charges
brought by the Yale TA union against Yale University back to the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to determine, inter alia, whether
these TAs are employees within the meaning of the NLRA. 12 On
March 29, 2000, the ALJ approved a settlement between the NLRB
and Yale University that resolved the unfair labor practice charges
but did not address whether the Yale TAs are employees. 13 On April
3, 2000, NLRB Regional Director Daniel Silverman applied the new
service test to a representation petition on behalf of NYU TAs and
RAs and found that they were employees within the meaning of the
NLRA,14 the first such application and finding. The university
sought review of the New York University decision by the NLRB
which was granted on May 10, 2000.15 Moreover, on the day after-
and undoubtedly encouraged by-the New York University decision,
the Yale TA union appealed the settlement in that case. 16 Thus the
question of which test should be applied to the Yale and NYU TAs
and RAs and whether they are employees under one, both, or neither
of the tests continues to await final adjudication by the NLRB or,
possibly, a federal court.
This Comment argues that all TAs (as well as some RAs) at
Yale, NYU, and other private universities should be recognized as
employees under the service test, because they provide compensated
services, and even under the old primary purpose test, because they
11. See Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 1999 WL 1076118,
at *13-15 (Nov. 26, 1999) (holding that medical house staff are employees in-
ter alia because they provide compensated services).
12. See Yale Univ., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 1999 WL 1076116, at *6 (Nov.
29, 1999).
13. See Martha Kessler, Education: NLRB, Yale University Reach Accord
in Dispute Arising from 1995 Grade Strike, DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 31, 2000,
atA8.
14. New York Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-29 to E-30 (NLRB
Apr. 3, 2000).
15. See UAW Blasts NYU Interference with Vote Count in Student Em-
ployee Recognition Election, PRNEWSWIRE, May 11, 2000.
16. See e-mail message to the author from Michael T. Anderson of the law
firm of Davis, Cowell & Bowe, Apr. 7, 2000.
1851June 2000]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELESLA WREVIEW [Vol. 33:1849
seek employment primarily for economic reasons. 17 It further argues
that these TAs should not be excluded from NLRA coverage for
public policy reasons. 18 Both arguments are supported by two recent
California Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) decisions,
each holding that TAs are employees within the meaning of Califor-
nia's Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act
19
(HEERA), and that coverage of TAs under HEERA would further
the purposes of HEERA.2 °
The analysis set forth in this Comment calls for a comparison of
California and federal law for several reasons. First, HEERA bal-
ances the old primary purpose test against the new service test. Sec-
ond, the purposes of HEERA are similar to the public policies behind
the NLRA. Third, employees have similar rights under HEERA and
the NLRA, including the right to strike. Finally, in the first of its two
recent decisions, the NLRB invited such a comparison by quoting
from a California Supreme Court decision which held that coverage
17. In his decision in the New York University case, Regional Director Sil-
verman did not address the issue whether the TAs and RAs at that university
are employees under the old primary purpose test. See New York Univ., 66
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-22 to E-34. Since it is far from clear that the
NLRB or a federal court will apply the service test instead of the primary pur-
pose test to TAs and RAs, as well as medical house staff, a discussion of not
only the former but also the latter test is called for.
18. Regional Director Silverman only briefly addressed one type of fre-
quently cited public policy argument against coverage of TAs and RAs (in-
fringement upon academic issues) and did not address at all another important
type of argument (increase in the number of TA and RA strikes). See id. In
fact, Regional Director Silverman appears to be somewhat hostile toward such
arguments, stressing "the danger of the [NLRB] relying on 'policy reasons' to
exclude from the [NLRA]'s coverage those who otherwise fall within [its]
broad definition of 'employee'." Id. at E-31 n.48. The NLRB and, especially,
a federal court can be expected to be more receptive to such arguments, and
their discussion in this context is therefore particularly important.
19. CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 3560-3595 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
20. See Association of Student Employees, 22 PERC 29084 (Cal. Pub.
Employment Relations Bd. 1998); Student Ass'n of Graduate Employees, 23
PERC 30025 (Cal. Pub. Employment Relations Bd. 1998); see also Student
Ass'n of Graduate Employees, 23 PERC 30065 (Cal. Pub. Employment Re-
lations Bd. 1999); Association of Student Employees, 22 PERC 29152 (Cal.
Pub. Employment Relations Bd. 1998); Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 20 PERC
27129 (Cal. Pub. Employment Relations Bd. A.L.J. 1996). Regional Direc-
tor Silverman did not refer to any of these cases in his decision in New York
Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-22 to E-34.
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of medical house staff by HEERA would further the purposes of
HEERA.2 1 The NLRB relied on this quote to support its decision
that coverage of house staff under the NLRA would not violate the
public policies behind the NLRA.22 Interestingly, the California
PERB has twice relied on the same quote from the California Su-
preme Court to support its decision that coverage of TAs by HEERA
would further the statute's purposes. 23 By the same token, the NLRB
should similarly rely on this quote and accordingly hold that cover-
age of the Yale and NYU TAs by the NLRA would not violate the
public policies behind this act. As a result, the NLRB should decide
that the Yale and NYU TAs have the right to bargain collectively,
and thereby open the door to the unionization of TAs at all private
universities.
Parts II and II[ summarize the federal and California laws, re-
spectively, as they pertain to student employees. Part IV synthe-
sizes-to a degree-these two bodies of law and argues that cover-
age of TAs at California's public universities under California's
HEERA supports coverage of TAs at America's private universities
under the federal NLRA. Part V concludes that such coverage is de-
sirable, legally supported, and thus, in a word, appropriate.
II. THE NLRA AND STUDENT EMPLOYEES AT AMERICA'S
PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES:
SUMMARY OF THE FEDERAL LAW
A. Introduction
Student employees at private universities are covered by federal
law, that is, by the NLRA as interpreted by the NLRB and the federal
courts. The remainder of this Part provides a summary of the federal
law and, in particular, of the rights and obligations of employees and
employers under the NLRA, the status of private universities as em-
ployers within the meaning of the NLRA, and the status of student
21. See Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 1999 WL 1076118,
at *21 (Nov. 26, 1999) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. PERB, 41 Cal.
3d 601, 623, 715 P.2d 590, 604-05, 224 Cal. Rptr. 631, 645-46 (1986)).
22. See id.
23. See Student Employees, 22 PERC 29084, at 354; Graduate Employ-
ees, 23 PERC 30025, at 87.
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employees at such universities as employees within the meaning of
the NLRA.
B. Rights and Obligations of Employees and Employers
Under the NLRA
The NLRA gives employees "the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection," as well as "the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities. 24 The NLRA further makes it an unfair labor
practice, inter alia, for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or co-
erce employees in the exercise of [these] rights," 25 "to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization" "by discrimina-
tion in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condi-
tion of employment,, 26 or "to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees ' 27 who have been "designated or
selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of
the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes." 28 Thus, un-
der the NLRA, it is, for example, illegal for employers to threaten
their employees with the loss of their jobs should they elect a un-
ion,29 to lay off some of their employees after they have elected a
union to discourage other employees from doing likewise,30 or to
24. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
25. Id. § 158(a)(1).
26. Id. § 158(a)(3).
27. Id. § 158(a)(5).
28. Id. § 159(a).
29. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 619 (1969)
(finding that the employer violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) where, upon learning
of a unionization drive, the employer told employees the union was a strike-
happy outfit, a possible strike would jeopardize the continued operation of the
plant, and age and lack of education would make their re-employment diffi-
cult).
30. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380
U.S. 263, 275 (1965) (holding that "a partial closing is an unfair labor practice
under [29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)] if motivated by a purpose to chill unionism in
any of the remaining plants of the single employer and if the employer may
reasonably have foreseen that such closing would likely have that effect").
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refuse to bargain or to engage in "surface" (that is, bad faith) bar-
gaining with a properly elected union.
31
To whom these rights and obligations extend is less clear than
one might initially think. The NLRA itself offers only circular
32
definitions of the key terms "employer" and "employee": "The term
'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of an employer
... .,33 "The term 'employee' shall include any employee,... un-
less this subchapter explicitly states otherwise.. .. ,34 Explicitly ex-
cluded from the employer category are, among others, "the United
States or any wholly owned Government corporation, . . . or any
State or political subdivision thereof.... As a consequence, only
private, not public employees enjoy the protection of the NLRA.
Explicitly excluded from the employee category are, among others,
independent contractors and supervisors. 36 In addition, the NLRB
and the federal courts have excluded managerial
37 and confidential 38
employees from the employee category on public policy grounds.
The policy underlying the NLRA is "to eliminate ... certain sub-
stantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce ... by encourag-
ing the practice and procedure of collective bargaining. . . ."39 Ex-
tending collective bargaining rights to managerial and confidential
employees would place these vital employees and their employers on
different sides of the bargaining table, thus arguably erecting rather
31. See, e.g., NLRB v. A-1 King Size Sandwiches, Inc., 732 F.2d 872, 877
(11th Cir. 1984) (holding that the NLRB "correctly inferred bad faith" in vio-
lation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) from the employer's proposals, which were "so
unusually harsh and unreasonable" that they were "predictably unworkable").
32. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 254 (1976) (Fanning,
Member, dissenting).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
34. Id. § 152(3).
35. Id. § 152(2).
36. See id. § 152(3).
37. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 283 (1974)
(holding that the legislative history suggests that Congress regarded managerial
employees as "so clearly outside the [NLRA] that no specific exclusionary
provision was thought necessary").
38. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp.,
454 U.S. 170, 179 (1981) (excluding employees with advance information of
the employer's position on labor relations matters from coverage by the
NLRA).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
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than eliminating obstructions to the free flow of commerce, contrary
to public policy.
It follows that only student employees at private (but not public)
universities are potentially covered by the NLRA. Whether they are
actually covered initially hinges on two questions: whether private
universities are employers within the meaning of the NLRA, and
whether student employees at these universities are employees within
the meaning of the NLRA. Even if it appears that the NLRB should
answer these two questions affirmatively, the NLRB may still ex-
clude student employees, like managerial or confidential employees,
from coverage by the act on public policy grounds. Each of these is-
sues will be discussed below in detail.
C. Private Universities Are Employers Within the
Meaning of the NLRA
Until 1970, the NLRB declined to assert jurisdiction over pri-
vate universities. Under the NLRA, the NLRB directs a union elec-
tion and certifies the results thereof only if "a question of representa-
tion affecting commerce exists. 4 ° In Columbia University,a' a union
filed a petition to represent clerical employees in the university li-
braries.4 2 The NLRB dismissed the petition on jurisdictional
grounds, reasoning that "[a]lthough the activities of Columbia Uni-
versity affect commerce sufficiently to satisfy the requirements of
the statute ... it would [not] effectuate the policies of the [NLRA]
for the [NLRB] to assert jurisdiction . . . where the activities in-
volved are noncommercial in nature and intimately connected with
the charitable purposes and educational activities of the institu-
tion.A
3
In 1970, the NLRB reversed its position and asserted jurisdic-
tion over private universities in Cornell University.4 4 In that case,
the university filed a petition seeking elections to determine the bar-
gaining representatives of some of its nonacademic employees.
4 5
40. Id. § 159(c)(1).
41. 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951).
42. See id. at 424.
43. Id. at 425, 427.
44. 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
45. See id. at 329.
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The NLRB reached the merits of the case, concluding, on the basis of
changed economic realities, that being "[c]harged with providing
peaceful and orderly procedures to resolve labor controversy, . . .
[the NLRB] can best effectuate the policies of the Act by asserting
jurisdiction over nonprofit, private educational institutions... whose
operations have a substantial effect on commerce ... .,46 Only after
this decision was the NLRB faced with the question of whether stu-
dent employees at private universities are employees for the purposes
of the NLRA. The discussion of this more controversial question
will occupy the remaining two sections of this Part.
D. The Old "Primary Purpose" Test:
Only Students Who Take Employment for Primarily Economic
Rather than Primarily Educational Purposes Are Employees
1. Adelph 47 and Leland Stanford
4 8
In a series of cases in the early 1970s, the NLRB found that stu-
dent employees were primarily students rather than primarily em-
ployees and were therefore precluded from joining with nonstudent
employees in a single bargaining unit49 or forming a bargaining unit
of their own.50 Two of these cases, Adelphi and Leland Stanford, in-
volve fact patterns that resemble the fact patterns in Yale and New
York University more closely than the fact patterns in Cedars-Sinai
46. Id. at 334.
47. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).
48. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974).
49. See Barnard College, 204 N.L.R.B. 1134 (1973) (office clerical and
other nonprofessional administrative staff employees, including graduate stu-
dents employed in the residence halls, as desk attendants at the bowling alley,
and at the entrance of the college activities building, and undergraduate stu-
dents who work as typists in the college activities office); Cornell Univ., 202
N.L.R.B. 290 (1973) (full-time and regular part-time dining facilities employ-
ees, including students); Georgetown Univ., 200 N.L.R.B. 215 (1972) (full-
time and regular part-time service and maintenance employees, including stu-
dents); College of Pharm. Sciences, 197 N.L.R.B. 959 (1972) (graduate student
TAs with full-time and regular part-time faculty); Adelphi, 195 N.L.R.B. at
639 (graduate student TAs and RAs with full-time and regular part-time fac-
ulty).
50. See San Francisco Art Inst., 226 N.L.R.B. 1251 (1976) (part-time stu-
dent janitors); Leland Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 621 (graduate student RAs).
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and St. Clare's. Adelphi and Leland Stanford are therefore discussed
in some detail in this subsection.
As noted previously, the NLRA requires employers to bargain
with "[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit ap-
propriate for such purposes ... .51 In determining whether a unit is
appropriate for collective bargaining purposes, the NLRB relies on a
"community of interests" test that essentially asks whether the em-
ployees in the unit have enough in common to allow for effective
collective bargaining on their behalf.
52
In Adelphi, one hundred graduate student TAs and twenty-five
graduate student RAs sought to join with six hundred faculty mem-
bers and professional librarians in a single bargaining unit.53 Ap-
proximately two-thirds of the TAs worked in the sciences where they
taught laboratory courses and recitation classes that were part of fac-
ulty-led courses.54 TAs working outside the sciences had no regular
classes but sometimes substituted for absent faculty members and as-
sisted in preparing examinations and grading papers.55 All RAs
worked in the sciences where they did not teach but instead worked
with faculty members on research projects.56 Graduate assistants
were expected to devote twenty hours per week to these duties for
which they received free tuition plus compensation ranging from
$1200 to $2900 per academic year.57 After noting that the employ-
ment of graduate assistants depended entirely on their continued
status as graduate students working toward their degree,58 the NLRB
observed that graduate assistants
do not have faculty rank, are not listed in the University's
51. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
52. See NLRB v. Pumell's Pride, Inc., 609 F.2d 1153, 1156 (5th Cir. 1980)
(whether a group of employees is united by "community of interest" depends
on such factors as bargaining history, operational integration, geographic
proximity, common supervision, similarity in job function, and degree of em-
ployee interchange (quoting NLRB v. J.C. Penny Co., 559 F.2d 373, 375 (5th
Cir. 1977)).
53. See Adelphi, 195 N.L.R.B. at 639-40.
54. See id. at 640.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
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catalogues as faculty members, have no vote at faculty
meetings, are not eligible for promotion or tenure, are not
covered by the University personnel plan, have no standing
before the University's grievance committee, and, except
for health insurance, do not participate in any of the fringe-
benefits available to faculty members.
59
Moreover, graduate assistants, unlike faculty members, were super-
vised by faculty members.60 On these facts, the NLRB found "that
the graduate teaching and research assistants here involved, although
performing some faculty-related functions, are primarily students
and do not share a sufficient community of interest with the regular
faculty to warrant their inclusion in the unit."
61
A comparison of the characteristics of student employees and
nonstudent employees is appropriate where the question is whether
student employees may join with nonstudent employees in a single
bargaining unit under the community of interest test. However, such
a comparison is arguably not appropriate where the question is
whether student employees may form a bargaining unit of their own.
Yet, the NLRB seems to have engaged in precisely this kind of com-
parison in Leland Stanford.62 There, eighty-three graduate student
RAs of the physics department sought to form a bargaining unit of
their own.63 These RAs performed research required by their pro-
gram which ultimately led towards their theses and degrees.64 The
assistantships were one of several ways in which the university pro-
vided financial aid for its graduate students to do what was required
of them to earn their degrees.65 The NLRB observed that "there is no
correlation between what is being done and the amount received by
the student, nor is there a correlation between the hours spent in re-
search and the amount received. 66 The NLRB went on to say that
although RA's are paid through Stanford's payroll machin-
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974).
63. See id. at 621.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 622.
66. Id.
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ery, they do not share the fringe benefits of employees but
do have the privileges enjoyed by other students. Thus they
have the student health care and insurance, share in various
campus activities, and may use student housing; they get no
vacation, sick leave, or retirement benefits and have no
schooling benefits for their children. Significantly, the
payments to the RA's are tax exempt income.
67
Accordingly, the NLRB concluded "that the research assistants in the
physics department are primarily students, and ... they are not em-
ployees within the meaning of... the Act."
68
However, while the fact that student employees do not share the
fringe benefits of other employees may prove that student employees
do not have enough in common with other employees to join with
them in a single bargaining unit, this fact does little to prove that stu-
dent employees should not form a bargaining unit of their own. Af-
ter all, lack of fringe benefits may be precisely the reason why these
employees want to engage in collective bargaining, and fringe bene-
fits are a typical example of "other conditions of employment" which
are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining under the NLRA.69
While in Leland Stanford, the NLRB held that RAs should not
be allowed to form bargaining units of their own, it has never simi-
larly held that TAs should not be allowed to form bargaining units of
their own, either. This fact will become important below, in the dis-
cussion of the cases involving the Yale and NYU TAs.
2. Cedars-Sinai70 and St. Clare's71
Adelphi and Leland Stanford established that student employees
who are primarily students are not employees for the purposes of the
NLRA.7 These decisions, however, did not provide much guidance
with respect to the question of what, beyond the specific fact patterns
presented there, makes student employees primarily students.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 623 (emphasis added).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
70. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976).
71. St. Clare's Hosp. and Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977).
72. See supra notes 61, 68 and accompanying text.
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Two subsequent cases involving medical house staff clarified the
matter but raised new questions of their own.
In Cedars-Sinai, which was decided in 1976, thirty-four interns,
eighty-six residents, and twenty-four clinical fellows working at a
private nonprofit medical center sought recognition as a collective
bargaining unit:
73
An intern is a medical school graduate serving his first pe-
riod of graduate medical training in a hospital. Most states
... require an internship of I year to qualify for the exami-
nation to practice medicine. A resident is a physician who
has completed an internship and serves a period of more
advanced training, lasting from 1 to 5 years, in a specialty.
A clinical fellow is a physician who has completed an in-
ternship and a residency and is taking an educational post-
graduate program to qualify for certification in an identifi-
able subspecialty of medicine.
74
The majority of the Cedars-Sinai NLRB found that "[w]hile the
house staff spends a great percentage of their time in direct patient
care, this is simply the means by which... [they] acquire the neces-
sary diagnostic skills and experience to practice [their] profession."
75
Accordingly, the majority held that the house staff "participate in
these programs not for the purpose of earning a living; instead they
are there to pursue the graduate medical education that is a require-
ment for the practice of medicine." 76 This made interns, residents,
and clinical fellows "primarily students ... that ... are not employ-
ees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act.""7
The primary purpose test that was developed by the NLRB ma-
jority in Cedars-Sinai made the student's subjective motivation for
taking employment the crucial factor in determining whether he or
she is or is not an employee within the meaning of the NLRA: Only
students who took employment for primarily economic purposes-
but not students who took employment for primarily educational pur-
poses-were employees within the meaning of the NLRA.
73. See Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 252.
74. Id. at 251.
75. Id. at 253.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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From its conception, the primary purpose test has come under
vigorous attack. In his dissent in Cedars-Sinai, NLRB Member Fan-
ning argued that there was no basis for excluding student employees
who take employment for primarily educational purposes from the
employee category.7 8 Fanning's dissent articulated the position that
the NLRB adopted last year in Boston Medical. In particular, Mem-
ber Fanning noted that "[s]ection 2(3) of the [NLRA] states that the
term 'employee' is meant to 'include any employee.., unless the
[NLRA] explicitly states otherwise,'" ' 79 as, for example, in the case
of independent contractors or supervisors. 80 He further noted that the
only exceptions to this rule are those mandated by federal labor law
policy, as in the case of managerial and confidential employees.
8 1
Member Fanning further noted that the NLRA did not explicitly ex-
clude from the employee category students who take employment for
primarily educational purposes and that federal labor law policy does
not mandate such an exclusion, either.82 Accordingly, in Member
Fanning's view, student employees should be employees under the
NLRA as long as they are covered by the conventional meaning of
the term "employee," 83 regardless of the purpose for which they take
employment.
Although all house staff are M.D.'s, 84 and their situation is thus
quite distinct from student employees who are still working toward
their academic degrees, the NLRB held a year later, in St. Clare's,
85
that "Cedars-Sinai ...is primarily a decision about students."
86
Thus the NLRB made clear that the rule and rationale of Cedars-
Sinai covered not only hospital house staff but also student employ-
ees still working toward their degrees.
The majority in St. Clare's also responded to some of the criti-
cism voiced a year earlier in Member Fanning's Cedars-Sinai
78. See id. at 254 (Fanning, Member, dissenting).
79. Id. (Fanning, Member, dissenting) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)).
80. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
81. See Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 254 (Fanning, Member, dissenting);
see also supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
82. See Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 254 (Fanning, Member, dissenting).
83. See infra Part lI.E.1.
84. See Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 255 (Fanning, Member, dissenting).
85. 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977).
86. Id. at 1000.
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dissent.87 In St. Clare 's, the NLRB majority for the first time sup-
plied policy reasons for its decision to deny representation to stu-
dents performing services at their educational institutions which are
directly related to their educational program. The NLRB majority
observed that
the mutual interests of [such] students and the educational
institution in the services being rendered are predominantly
academic rather than economic in nature. Such interests...
are not readily adaptable to the collective-bargaining proc-
ess. It is for this reason that the Board has determined that
the national labor policy does not require-and in fact pre-
cludes-the extension of collective-bargaining rights and
obligations to [these students].88
The NLRB majority went on to say that
the student-teacher relationship . . . is predicated upon a
mutual interest in the advancement of the student's educa-
tion and is thus academic in nature. The [employee-
employer relationship] is largely predicated upon conflict-
87. In addition, the majority in St. Clare's set up four rigid categories of
student employees to determine their status as employees for the purposes of
the NLRA. See id. at 1000-02. The second category involved students who
"are employed by their own educational institution in a capacity unrelated to
their course of study. In such cases, the Board has historically excluded the
students from [bargaining] units which include nonstudent employees and have
[sic] not afforded them the privilege of being represented separately." Id. at
1001. The fourth category consists of students who "perform services at their
educational institutions which are directly related to their educational program.
In such cases, the Board has universally excluded students from [bargaining]
units which include nonstudent employees, and in addition has denied them the
right to be represented separately." Id. at 1002. This classificatory scheme
roundly denied the right to bargain collectively to both TAs and RAs, who fall
into either of these two categories just described. The NLRB, however, has
not stuck to this scheme. In University of West Los Angeles, 321 N.L.R.B. 61,
63 (1996), the NLRB granted five student law library clerks the right to join
with four nonstudent clerks in a single bargaining unit, although these student
clerks fell into the second of the four categories. Under St. Clare's, they there-
fore would not even have had the right to form a bargaining unit of their own.
Although West Los Angeles did not formally overrule St. Clare's or Cedars-
Sinai, in retrospect it created the first crack in the legal structure built on the
foundation of the latter two cases. That crack opened wide three years later in
the outright reversal of both St. Clare's and Cedars-Sinai.
88. St. Clare's, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1002 (emphasis added).
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ing interests of the employer to minimize costs and the em-
ployees to maximize wages, and is thus economic in nature
.... The inevitable change in emphasis from quality edu-
cation to economic concerns which would accompany in-
jection of collective bargaining into the student-teacher
relationship would... prove detrimental to both labor and
educational policies.
89
In addition, the NLRB majority voiced concerns that if collective
bargaining rights were extended to students performing services at
their educational institutions that are directly related to their educa-
tional program,
many academic freedoms would become bargainable as
wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment ....
[Further,] failure to recommend program continuation
would be tantamount to discharge and thus a mandatory
subject of bargaining .... [In addition,] other academic
prerogatives such as examinations, grading, course content
and materials, program duration and teaching methods
would be likely to find their way eventually to the bargain-
ing table.
90
These concerns are independent of the question of what consti-
tutes the appropriate test for student employee status-primary pur-
pose (discussed in this section) or services (discussed in the next
section). Under either test, concerns about the potential interference
of collective bargaining with academic issues may be grounds for
exclusion of student employees from coverage under the NLRA.
These concerns will therefore remain important throughout the re-
mainder of this Comment.
In conclusion, under the primary purpose test developed in Ce-
dars-Sinai and confirmed in St. Clare's, the NLRB would have
granted collective bargaining rights only to those students who took
employment for primarily economic rather than primarily educa-
tional reasons. As applied, the test prevented virtually all student
employees at America's private universities from bargaining
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 1003.
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collectively. 9' This might soon change dramatically, now that the
NLRB has overruled Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare's in Boston Medi-
cal, replacing the primary purpose test with the more student em-
ployee organizing-friendly service test. The next section discusses
the latter case and the new test.
E. The New "Services" Test:
All Students Who Provide Compensated Services Are Employees
1. Member Fanning's Cedars-Sinai dissent
As discussed above, Member Fanning argued in his Cedars-
Sinai dissent against the NLRB majority's primary purpose test, and
maintained that student employees are employees under the NLRA
as long as they are covered by the conventional meaning of the term
employee, regardless of the purpose for which they take employ-
ment.92 Member Fanning noted that "[tihe term 'employee' is the
outgrowth of the common law concept of the 'servant' and that "[a]t
common law, a servant was a 'person employed to perform services
in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct
in the performance of the services is subject to the other's control or
right of control.['],, 93 He further observed that "it is generally con-
ceded, today, that ... consideration is necessary for classification as
an 'employee' and concluded that "[tihe conventional meaning of
the word ['employee'] implies someone who works or performs a
service for another from whom he or she receives compensation."
94
According to this service test, anyone who provides compensated
services is an employee. Member Fanning then applied this test to
the medical house staff at issue in Cedars-Sinai:
[A] housestaff officer can be called upon ... to open the
chest wall of a 3-year-old child; hold the heart of a patient
in his hands; remove breast tissues, kidneys, veins; deliver
91. For a rare exception, see University of West Los Angeles, 321 N.L.R.B.
61 (1996), discussed supra note 87.
92. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
93. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 254-55 (1976) (Fanning,
Member, dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 200
(1957)).
94. Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 255 (Fanning, Member, dissenting).
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babies; insert tubes in the trachea of newborns and catheters
into abdominal cavities; administer closely controlled and
potentially lethal medications; and perform a host of similar
procedures. For those services ...the hospital pays the
housestaff officer what my colleagues call a "stipend."...
These "stipends" are compensation for services rendered
.... The recipients are, therefore, employees.
95
For almost a quarter of a century, Member Fanning's service test
represented only a minority position on the NLRB, while the primary
purpose test represented the majority position. However, during this
period, the service test was influential in the development of state la-
bor law.96 Moreover, twenty-three years after Cedars-Sinai, a three-
to-two majority of the NLRB, in Boston Medical, discarded the pri-
mary purpose test and adopted instead the service test.
2. Boston Medical
In Boston Medical,97 about 430 house staff at the health center
of the same name sought recognition as a collective bargaining
unit.9 8 As pointed out by the NLRB's regional director in his Deci-
sion and Order, these house staff were in substantially the same
situation as the house staff in Cedars-Sinai.99 Thus, the house staff
at Boston Medical Center were responsible for hospital admissions,
including initiating treatment and ordering medication, and hospital
discharges, including care instructions and prescription orders.
100
These house staff started intravenous lines or drew blood, mostly
without supervision by an attending physician.10 1 They also re-
sponded to "codes," i.e., life-threatening emergencies, again without
attending physicians. 102 The house staff helped families make life or
death decisions regarding the level of intervention to be used in the
case of critically ill infants and children, and wrote "do not
95. Id. at 255 & 256 n.17 (Fanning, Member, dissenting).
96. See infra note 189.
97. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 1999 WL 1076118 (Nov.
26, 1999).
98. See id. at *2.
99. See id. at *76.
100. See id. at *4.
101. See id.
102. See id.
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resuscitate" orders for terminally ill patients at the request of patients
or their families, although such orders had to be cosigned by an at-
tending physician within twenty-four hours. 103 House staff took care
of entire wards at night without an attending physician. 10 4 They per-
formed increasingly complicated surgery as their experience grew,
with a physician in attendance only during the critical portion of each
operation. 0 5 For these services, the house staff received annual
compensation ranging from about $34,000 to over $44,000, which
was generally unrelated to the number of hours they worked. 10 6 In
addition, they received paid vacation, sick, parental, and bereave-
ment leave, were entitled to health, dental, and life insurance, and
use of the employee health services, but could not participate in the
retirement program. 
107
The NLRB majority started its analysis by adopting Member
Fanning's service test:
In his dissent in Cedars-Sinai, then-Member Fanning traced
the Act's definition of "employee" as an out-growth of the
common law concept of the "servant."... At common law,
a servant was one who performed services for another and
was subject to the other's control or right of control. Con-
sideration, i.e. payment, is strongly indicative of employee
status .... We agree with this analysis.
10 8
The NLRB majority then applied the service test to the situation
of the house staff at Boston Medical Center: "First, house staff work
for an employer within the meaning of the Act. Second, house staff
are compensated for their services .... Third, house staff provide
patient care for the Hospital."'1 9 The NLRB concluded that these
"essential elements of the house staff's relationship with the Hospital
obviously define an employer-employee relationship."
110
103. See id.
104. See id. at *5.
105. See id.
106. See id. at *7.
107. See id.
108. Id. at *13 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at *14-15.
110. Id. at *14.
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The employer in Boston Medical raised many of the same policy
concerns against coverage of the house staff under the NLRA that
had already been brought up by the NLRB majority in St. Clare's."11
Thus, the employer argued that graduate medical education was not
compatible with the economic relationship contemplated by the
NLRA, that bargaining would undermine both the educational proc-
ess and academic freedom, and that the academic nature of the rela-
tionship between house staff and hospital did not allow for equal
participation by a labor organization in determining standards for
evaluation, promotion, discipline, and dismissal.!
2
The two NLRB dissenters in Boston Medical shared these con-
cerns. Member Hurtgen concluded that "as a policy matter, the
Board should continue ... to exclude [house staff] for purposes of
collective bargaining."' 1 3  In his more detailed dissent, Member
Brame first argued that "[b]ecause education requires inequality, the
concept of bargaining parity on which the Act is based, and the view
that equal bargaining strength will serve the national interest, are
simply inapplicable."' 1 4 Member Brame next contended that "[e]ven
when such core subjects of bargaining as job assignment and rota-
tions, training opportunities, starting dates, and 'promotions' are
considered, it is evident that traditional collective bargaining is com-
pletely unsuited to resolve differences that many [sic] arise" because
these subjects may be under the control of individual attending phy-
sicians or governed by national standards and thus out of the control
of the employer, Boston Medical Center.115 Member Brame finally
claimed that tools of economic warfare, primarily strikes and lock-
outs, contemplated by the NLRA to resolve differences when efforts
to bargain break down, "fit poorly with graduate medical education"
because "by striking a [house staff] would on the one hand extend by
the duration of the strike the amount of time required to complete the
[house staff] program, and, on the other hand, be limited, relative to
striking employees, in his or her ability to secure equivalent
111. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
112. See Boston Med., 1999 WL 1076118, at *8.
113. Id. at *28 (Hurtgen, Member, dissenting).
114. Id. at *43 (Brame, Member, dissenting).
115. Id. at *44 (Brame, Member, dissenting).
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employment with another program. ' 116 In other words, in the dis-
sent's view, a strike is an ineffective tool in the hands of medical
house staff.
If house staff cannot effectively use economic weapons, this of
course greatly reduces the likelihood that house staff will actually re-
sort to economic weapons, a fact that should assuage the employer's
and the minority's fear of house staff strikes, rather than give rise to
concern.
The Boston Medical NLRB majority addressed the alleged inap-
propriateness of collective bargaining between house staff and hos-
pitals principally by suggesting that the NLRB could use its power
under the NLRA to preclude collective bargaining over any subject
ill-suited for this process.1 17 Under the NLRA, employer and em-
ployees are only obligated to bargain collectively over "mandatory"
subjects of bargaining, i.e., "wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment," 18 but they do not have to do so over other,
"permissive" subjects of bargaining. 119 Thus the parties must bar-
gain only over "issues that [directly] settle an aspect of the relation-
ship between the employer and employees," 120 but not over issues
that "have only an indirect and attenuated impact on the employment
relationship.' '121 Furthermore, employers and employees may resort
to economic weapons only in connection with mandatory subjects of
bargaining, but not in connection with permissive subjects of bar-
gaining.122 As a consequence, by determining that academic issues
and other subjects ill-suited for collective bargaining have only an
indirect impact on the employment relationship and are therefore
permissive rather than mandatory subjects of bargaining, the NLRB
116. Id. at *45 (Brame, Member, dissenting).
117. See id. at *20.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
119. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U.S. 157, 185-86 (1971).
120. Id. at 178.
121. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677 (1981)
(citing Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
122. See Dobbs Houses, Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 531, 537 (5th Cir. 1963)
(holding that the discharge of a supervisor was a "managerial prerogative," i.e.,
not a mandatory subject of bargaining, and that a strike over the supervisor
discharge was, therefore, unprotected).
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could preclude bargaining, as well as striking, over these subjects.
The NLRB majority reserved this task for the future:
The contour of collective bargaining is dynamic... : what
can be bargained about... may change .... We need not
define here the boundaries between permissive and man-
datory subjects of bargaining concerning [house staff], and
between what can be bargained over and what cannot. We
will address those issues later, if they arise.
123
The NLRB majority addressed the issue of house staff strikes
from an additional angle:
[S]ince an overriding purpose of the 1974 Healthcare
Amendments was the elimination of recognition strikes and
picketing, according house staff employee status will have
the beneficial purpose of bringing them within the ambit of
the Act, and providing a mechanism for resolving recogni-
tion and other representation issues without resort to such
tactics.
124
According to the NLRB majority, coverage under the NLRA de-
creases, rather than increases, the danger of house staff strikes, a
claim that (together with the other policy issues) will be discussed
more deeply below.
In conclusion, under the new service test adopted by the Boston
Medical NLRB majority, students are employees within the meaning
of the NLRA if they provide compensated services and if coverage
by the NLRA would not violate the purposes of the NLRA. In Bos-
ton Medical, the NLRB applied this test to medical house staff and
granted them collective bargaining rights under the NLRA. Three
days after the NLRB decided Boston Medical, it decided Yale,'125 in
which it set the stage for the application of the service test to student
employees other than medical house staff, namely, teaching assis-
tants.
123. Boston Med., 1999 WL 1076118, at *20 (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. 330 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 1999 WL 1076116 (Nov. 29, 1999).
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3. Yale
At Yale University, 1100 graduate teaching assistants and part-
time acting instructors (collectively, "TAs") in the humanities and
social sciences departments are seeking recognition as a collective
bargaining unit.12 6 In support of their demands, they staged a three-
day strike in February of 1992 by refusing to teach their classes.
127
A second conventional strike was staged in April of 1995 and lasted
one week. 128 Neither of these two job actions, nor an election among
the graduate students in the humanities and social sciences conducted
by the League of Women Voters, resulted in recognition of the union
by the university. 129
At the end of the 1995 fall semester, the TAs engaged in a third
job action that became the subject of the current litigation, in which
approximately 200 TAs refused to submit their students' final grades
for the semester to the university.130 The university retaliated by is-
suing a number of statements threatening adverse consequences of
prolonged grade-withholding, which the TA union charged interfered
with the TAs' exercise of section 7 rights in violation of section
8(a)(1) of the NLRA.131 The university further allegedly discrimi-
nated against striking TAs by disciplining them, removing them from
teaching assignments, subjecting them to closer supervision, and
eliminating their classes-actions which the TA union charged dis-
criminated with respect to tenure of employment and terms or condi-
tions of employment in order to discourage union membership in
violation of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.
132
In order for these charges to succeed, the activities with which
and because of which the university allegedly interfered and dis-
criminated must be protected by section 7 of the NLRA. Further, the
TAs with whose section 7 rights the university allegedly
126. See Ukeiley, supra note 7, at 531-32.
127. See Yale, 1999 WL 1076116, at *14.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at *1.
131. See id.; see also supra notes 25, 29 and accompanying text.
132. See Yale, 1999 WL 1076116, at *1; see also supra notes 26, 30 and ac-
companying text.
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interfered and against whom it allegedly discriminated must be em-
ployees within the meaning of the NLRA.
With respect to the first of these two issues, a majority of the
NLRB in Yale agreed with the ALJ that the grade-withholding itself
was not a protected activity because it was a partial strike, and be-
cause it involved misappropriation of university property. 131 Partial
strikes are unprotected because "[w]hile . . .employees ha[ve] the
undoubted right to go on a strike. . . , they [can]not continue to work
and remain at their positions, accept the wages paid to them, and at
the same time select what part of their allotted tasks they care[] to
perform .... Here, the TAs continued to perform some job-
related duties while they were withholding grades, including meeting
with students, proctoring exams, grading materials, writing letters of
evaluation, and preparing for the next term's classes.' 35 Misappro-
priation of employer property is unprotected because Congress, in
passing the NLRA, did not intend "to compel employers to retain
persons in their employ regardless of their unlawful conduct,-to in-
vest those who go on strike with an immunity from discharge for acts
of trespass or violence against the employer's property ... ,136
Here, The TAs withheld papers and test materials that were univer-
sity property. 
37
Although the grade-withholding itself was thus not a protected
activity, a different majority of the NLRB in Yale disagreed with the
AUJ and found that some of the threatening statements were over-
broad in that they referred to protected conduct other than the grade
strike.138 Two statements "broadly declared that a union is not ap-
propriate in academe," another statement "referred to the '[f]ailure to
perform any aspect of a graduate teaching assignment' as providing
grounds for negative evaluations and loss of teaching opportunities,"
and yet another statement "condemned strike activity by graduate
students 'under any circumstances. '139  Since these statements
133. See Yale, 1999 WL 1076116, at *2.
134. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486,496 (8th Cir. 1946).
135. See Yale, 1999 WL 1076116, at *2-3.
136. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255 (1939).
137. See Yale, 1999 WL 1076116, at *3.
138. See id. at *5-6.
139. Id. at 5.
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applied not only to the partial and therefore unprotected strike, but
also to any complete and therefore protected strikes, the Yale NLRB
majority concluded that the general counsel had satisfied its burden
to establish a prima facie case that these statements violated section
8(a)(1) of the NLRA. 140 The majority thus remanded the case for
further hearings before the ALJ, in which the university was to pres-
ent its defense. 1
41
With respect to the question of whether the TAs are employees
within the meaning of the NLRA, the Yale NLRB majority directed
the ALJ on remand to "provide the Board with findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the issue of the employee status of the T[A]s
under Section 2(3) of the Act, regardless of his ultimate findings on
the issue of whether the [university] violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act."
142
This order seemed to ensure that the question of whether TAs
are employees within the meaning of the NLRA would be answered
in the Yale case. 14 3 However, on March 29, 2000, the ALJ approved
a settlement between the NLRB and Yale University that resolved
the unfair labor practice charges but did not address whether the Yale
TAs are employees. 144 Under the agreement, the NLRB would with-
draw the unfair labor charges and in return, Yale University would
post notices describing the rights of employees under the NLRA and
promising not to violate these rights. 145 These notices are not admis-
sions that Yale University committed any unfair labor practices or
that the Yale TAs are, in fact, employees under the NLRA. 14 6 On the
day after NLRB Regional Director Daniel Silverman's decision that
TAs and RAs at NYU are employees under the NLRA,147 the Yale
140. See id.
141. See id. at *6.
142. Id.
143. The question of whether RAs are employees within the meaning of the
NLRA, on the other hand, will not be answered in the Yale case. Part IV be-
low, which deals with the employee status of Yale student employees, will
therefore focus on TAs, although it will also briefly discuss RAs.
144. See Kessler, supra note 13, at A8.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See New York Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-22, E-29, E-30
(NLRB Apr. 3, 2000); see also infra Part II.E.4.
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TA union appealed the settlement in that case. 148 New York Univer-
sity also having appealed the ruling in that case, 149 the NLRB will
now have to address the employee status of TAs and RAs at Yale,
NYU, and ultimately all private universities in light of the new serv-
ice test.
4. New York University
At NYU, a union sought to represent 1700 graduate student em-
ployees of which more than half were TAs and the rest were RAs.1
5 0
Some of the TAs worked as "graders" or "tutors" and were ex-
cluded from the bargaining unit by NLRB Regional Director Daniel
Silverman because their employment was "sporadic" and "irregu-
lar." 1'5' Other TAs assisted faculty members in the teaching of large
introductory survey or lecture courses by conducting "recitation" or
"lab" sections, holding office hours, and preparing, proctoring, or
grading exams or other work assignments. 152 Yet other TAs acted as
the "stand-alone" teacher or "teacher-of-record" for undergraduate
courses, especially in the Expository Writing Program, where TAs
taught ninety-five percent of the classes, and with respect to foreign
language instruction, which were also primarily provided by TAs.'
5 3
These TAs were responsible for the entire course: They taught
classes, graded exams and assignments, and held office hours. 154 In
the remainder of this Comment, the term "TA" as applied to NYU
refers only to these latter types of TAs but not to graders or tutors.
The RAs whom the union sought to represent assisted a profes-
sor in his or her research by checking references, doing bibliographi-
cal work, obtaining research materials, proofreading, and performing
archival work, or by recruiting subjects for experiments, collecting
148. See e-mail message to the author from Michael T. Anderson of the law
firm of Davis, Cowell & Bowe, Apr. 7, 2000.
149. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
150. See New York Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E23.
151. See id. at E-33 (citing Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 140 N.L.R.B.
1323 (1963); E.F. Drew & Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 155 (1961); Indiana Bottled Gas
Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1441 (1960); Sealite, Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 619 (1959)).
152. See id. at E-23.
153. See id. at E-23 to E-24.
154. See id. at E-24.
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and analyzing data, and entering data into computers. 55 Other RAs
whom the union did not seek to represent received funding from ex-
ternal faculty research grants and simply performed the research re-
quired for their dissertation: No other services were required from
these RAs. 156 In the remainder of this Comment, the term "RA" as
applied to NYU refers only to the former type of RA unless explic-
itly stated otherwise.
TAs and RAs were expected to work twenty hours per week in
these capacities.1 57 They were selected primarily on the basis of their
merits as opposed to their financial needs.' 58 In a few departments,
service as a TA or RA was a degree requirement. 159 In exchange for
their services, TAs and RAs received "stipends" ranging from $6500
to $20,000, full tuition remission, and a bookstore discount.1 60 They
generally did not receive the insurance or retirement benefits avail-
able to other NYU employees but were covered by workers' com-
pensation.
61
NLRB Regional Director Daniel Silverman applied to these TAs
and RAs the new service test adopted last year by the full NLRB in
Boston Medical for medical house staff.162 The Regional Director
concluded that the TAs and RAs "perform services under the control
and direction of the Employer, in exchange for compensation," and
that they therefore "meet the statutory definition of employee.
'" 163
The Regional Director further rejected the university's argument that
the TAs and RAs should be excluded from coverage for policy rea-
sons, stressing "the danger of the [NLRB] relying on 'policy reasons'
to exclude from [NLRA] coverage those who otherwise fall within
the [NLRA]'s broad definition of 'employee'. ' ' 164 In particular, the
Regional Director responded to the by now familiar university argu-
ment that "collective bargaining will interfere with the four essential
155. See id. at E-25.
156. See id. at E-26 to E-27.
157. See id. at E-26.
158. See id. at E-27.
159. See id. at E-24 to E-25.
160. See id. at E-23 n.7.
161. See id. at E-23 n.8.
162. See id.; supra Parts II.E.1, II.E.2.
163. New York Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-29 to E-30.
164. See id. at E-31 n.48.
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academic freedoms of 'who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught and who may be admitted to study' ' ' 165 with the
Boston Medical-inspired assertion that
[tihe conclusion that [TAs and RAs] are employees entitled
to engage in collective bargaining, of course, does not im-
ply that the four essential elements of academic freedom...
are necessarily mandatory subjects of collective bargaining
[,] because collective bargaining negotiations can be
limited to only those matters affecting wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment[, so] that the
critical elements of academic freedom need not be com-
promised.
166
The Regional Director further suggested that "[t]he asserted antici-
pated interference with academic freedom essentially appears to be a
fear that collective action over graduate student conditions of em-
ployment will be more influential and powerful than individual ac-
tion" and observed that to exclude TAs and RAs from coverage un-
der the NLRA on such grounds would "run[] directly contrary to the
express purposes of the [NLRA] . . . 'to eliminate the causes of cer-
tain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce... by en-
couraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
,,,167
With respect to those RAs whom the union did not seek to rep-
resent and who received funding from external faculty research
grants, the Regional Director observed that these RAs, like the ones
involved in Leland Stanford,168 did not perform any compensated
services for the university but rather performed "the same research
they would perform as part of their studies in order to complete their
dissertation, regardless of whether they received funding," and con-
cluded that they were therefore not employees within the meaning of
the NLRA.
1 6 9
165. Id. at E-32 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957)).
166. Id. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
167. New York Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-32 (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 151).
168. See supra notes 64-68, infra notes 340-43 and accompanying text.
169. New York Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-32 to E-33.
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While Yale's TA union hailed the New York University decision
as "a landmark ruling" which established "a precedent for the entire
country,,1 70 Yale's President Richard C. Levin reportedly "said that
the New York ruling did not apply to the Connecticut school.,
171
The NYU administration sought review of the Regional Director's
decision by the NLRB, which was granted on May 10, 2000.172 This
appeal, together with the Yale TA union's decision to appeal the set-
tlement in that case in the wake of the favorable New York University
decision,17 3 ensures that the issue of the employee status of TAs and
RAs at private universities will continue to occupy the NLRB and,
possibly, the federal courts for some time to come.
The discussion now turns to a summary of the California student
employee law, which influenced the NLRB in Boston Medical, and
which can also be expected to influence the future of the Yale174 and
New York University cases, before returning to these latter cases in
Part IV.
Im. HEERA AND STUDENT EMPLOYEES AT CALIFORNIA'S PUBLIC
UNIVERSITIES: SUMMARY OF THE CALIFORNIA LAW
A. Introduction
Student employees at public universities are covered by state
law. In California, they are covered by HEERA, 17 5 as interpreted by
the California PERB and the California courts. The remainder of this
Part provides a summary of California law and in particular of the
rights and obligations of employees and employers under HEERA.
This Part further discusses the status of student employees at Cali-
fornia's public universities as employees within the meaning of
HEERA.
170. Graduate Employees and Students Org., "Graduate Teachers are
Employees" (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.yale.edu/geso/links/
NYUNLRB.htm>.
171. Marc J. Armbinder, New York U. Grad Students Permitted to Unionize,
U-WIRE, Apr. 4, 2000, available in 2000 WL 17591351.
172. See UAW Blasts NYU Interference With Vote Count in Student Em-
ployee Recognition Election, supra note 15.
173. See supra note 148.
174. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
175. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3560-3595 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
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B. Rights and Obligations of Employees and Employers
Under HEERA
California's HEERA gives public university employees rights
that are similar to those which the NLRA gives America's private
employees. Thus, HEERA grants higher education employees "the
right to form, join and participate in the activities of employee or-
ganizations of their own choosing for the purpose of representation
on all matters of employer-employee relations and for the purpose of
meeting and conferring," as well as the right to refuse to do so.
176
HEERA further makes it an unlawful employer practice to "[i]mpose
or threaten to impose reprisals on employees, to discriminate or
threaten to discriminate against employees, or otherwise to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees because of their exercise of rights
guaranteed by [IEERA],' 177 to "[d]eny to employee organizations
rights guaranteed to them by [HEERA],' 8 or to "[r]efuse or fail to
engage in meeting and conferring with' 179 "any recognized or certi-
fied employee organization or person it authorizes to act on its be-
half."' 8 0
Unlike the NLRA, HEERA makes it reasonably clear to whom
these rights and obligations extend. In particular, although the stat-
ute generally replicates the circularity of the NLRA definition of the
term "employee""1 ' by stating that "'[e]mployee' or 'higher educa-
tion employee' means any employee of the Regents of the University
of California, the Directors of Hastings College of the Law, or the
Trustees of the California State University" except "managerial" and
"confidential employees,"'1 2 HEERA specifically addresses the
status of student employees:
176. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3565 (West 1998). See supra note 24 and accom-
panying text for the corresponding NLRA provision.
177. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3571(a) (West 1998). See supra notes 25-26 and
accompanying text for the corresponding NLRA provisions.
178. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3571(b).
179. Id. § 3571(c). See supra note 27 and accompanying text for the corre-
sponding NLRA provision.
180. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3562(i) (West Supp. 2000).
181. See supra note 32 and accompanying text for the same problem re-
garding the NLRA.
182. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3562(e). See supra note 34 and accompanying
text for the corresponding NLRA provision.
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The board may find student employees whose employment
is contingent on their status as students are employees only
if the services they provide are unrelated to their educa-
tional objectives, or, that those educational objectives are
subordinate to the services they perform and that coverage
under [HEERA] would further the purposes of [HEERA].
183
This HEERA test contains four prongs: a "contingency" prong, a
"relatedness" prong, a "balancing" prong, and a "policy" prong.
The first two prongs of the HEERA test are of little interest as
far as TAs and RAs are concerned, because their employment is vir-
tually always contingent on their status as students, and the services
they provide are, in the normal case, related to their educational ob-
jectives. The remainder of this Part discusses how California's
PERB and state courts, which are charged with the interpretation of
HBEERA, have answered the third and fourth prongs of the HEERA
test: Are the educational objectives of the student employees subor-
dinate to the services they provide, and would coverage of the stu-
dent employees under HEERA further the purpose of HEERA? The
first part of this question represents a compromise between the old
NLRB primary purpose test and the new NLRB service test. For this
reason, an answer to the balancing prong of the HEERA test regard-
ing California's public TAs can provide guidance for the application
of the NLRB tests to Yale's and NYU's private TAs and RAs.
Moreover, the purposes of HEERA are similar to the public policies
behind the NLRA. 184 For this reason, determining whether coverage
183. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(e) (emphasis added).
184. Compare CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3560(a) (West 1998) ("The people of the
State of California have a fundamental interest in the development of harmoni-
ous and cooperative labor relations between the public institutions of higher
education and their employees" (emphasis added)), and CAL. Gov'T CODE §
3561(c) (West 1998) ("It is the policy of the State of California to encourage
the pursuit of excellence in teaching, research, and learning through the free
exchange of ideas among the faculty, students, and staff of [California's public
universities]" (emphasis added)), with 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) ("[P]rotection
by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safe-
guards commerce from injury... by removing certain recognized sources of
industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to
wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bar-
gaining power between employers and employees .... It is... the policy of
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of California's public TAs under HEERA would further HEERA's
purposes can provide guidance as to whether coverage of Yale's and
NYU's private TAs and RAs under the NLRA would violate the
public policies behind the NLRA. These questions are addressed
below in Part IV.C.
C. HEERA's Balancing Test:
Only Students Whose Educational Objectives
Are Subordinate to the Services They Provide and Whose Coverage
under HEERA Would Further
HEERA Are Employees
1. Regents
HEERA was first applied to student employees in Regents of the
University of California v. Public Employment Relations Board,185
which was decided a decade after Cedars-Sinai. There, a union
comprised of medical house staff at various UC campuses sought
recognition as their collective bargaining representative. 186 Upon
facts that closely paralleled the facts in Cedars-Sinai,18 7 the PERB
found that the house staff's educational objectives were subordinate
to the services they performed, that coverage of the house staff under
HEERA would further the purposes of HEERA, and, accordingly,
that the house staff were employees within the meaning of
HEERA. 188
the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to
the free flow of comnmerce... by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection" (emphasis added)).
185. 41 Cal. 3d 601, 715 P.2d 590, 224 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1986).
186. See id. at 604, 715 P.2d at 592, 224 Cal. Rptr at 633.
187. See id. at 648, 715 P.2d at 622, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 663 (Lucas, J., dis-
senting).
188. See id. at 606, 715 P.2d at 593, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
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The California Supreme Court affirmed the PERB's decision.1 89
In doing so, the court clarified the meaning of the balancing prong of
the HEERA test. It rejected the dissent's view that by requiring the
educational objectives of student employees to be subordinate to the
services they perform, "[ihe [California] Legislature chose the [Ce-
dars-Sinai and St. Clare's] NLRB majority approach." 190 On the ba-
sis of the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, the
court instead concluded that
in defining "employees" under HEERA, the [California]
Legislature specifically rejected the NLRB rulings [in Ce-
dars-Sinai and St. Clare's]. Under the NLRB precedent, the
relevant inquiry is whether the student's objectives are pri-
marily academic. Under HEERA, even if the PERB finds
that housestaff are motivated by "educational objectives," it
may nevertheless classify them as "employees" if their ob-
jectives are "subordinate to the services they perform"
191
HEERA thus requires the students' subjective educational objectives,
which are the focus of the Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare 's primary pur-
pose test, to be balanced against the objective nature of the services
they perform, which is the focus of the service test of Member Fan-
ning's Cedars-Sinai dissent and Boston Medical.1 92 The court cor-
rectly observed that HEERA section 3562(f) "represents a compro-
mise between the majority and dissenting opinions expressed in the
NLRB decisions" in Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare S.
193
189. See id. at 624, 715 P.2d at 605, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 646. California thus
joined the District of Columbia, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, and Ohio in holding that medical house
staff at public institutions are employees entitled to collective bargaining. See
Jennifer A. Shorb, Note, Working Without Rights: Recognizing Housestaff
Unionization-An Argument for the Reversal of Cedars-Sinai Medical Center
and St. Clare's Hospital, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 1072 & nn.131-32 (1999).
Only one jurisdiction, Pennsylvania, has chosen to follow the NLRB and hold
that house staff are not employees. See id. at 1072 & n.132.
190. Regents, 41 Cal. 3d at 625, 715 P.2d at 606, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 647 (Lu-
cas, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 612-13, 715 P.2d at 597, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 638 (emphasis added).
192. See id. at 614, 715 P.2d at 598, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
193. Id. at 615, 715 P.2d at 599, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
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The court also addressed some public policy objections against
extending collective bargaining rights to house staff that had already
been raised in St. Clare's and that would later be raised again in
Boston Medical and New York University:194 "The University asserts
that if collective bargaining rights were given to housestaff the Uni-
versity's educational mission would be undermined by requiring bar-
gaining on subjects which are intrinsically tied to the educational as-
pects of the [house staff] programs."'195 To the court, "[t]his
'doomsday cry' seemed "somewhat exaggerated" and "premature":
"The argument basically concerns the appropriate scope of repre-
sentation under the [NLRA]. Such issues will undoubtedly arise in
specific factual contexts in which one side wishes to bargain over a
certain subject and the other side does not. These scope-of-
representation issues may be resolved by the [PERB] when they arise
. ,196 Thus the court in Regents dealt with the alleged inappropri-
ateness of collective bargaining between house staff and hospitals in
much the same way as the NLRB majority and the Regional Director
did later in Boston Medical and New York University, namely,
through the distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects
of bargaining. 97 In Regents, the university also argued that permit-
ting collective bargaining for house staff might lead to strikes.
198
The court counterargued that "it is widely recognized that collective
bargaining is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism which di-
minishes the probability that vital services will be interrupted."' 99
The NLRB majority later raised a similar counterargument in Boston
Medical.
200
Not only is the language of the Regents decision mirrored in the
language of the Boston Medical decision, but, as discussed in Part
IV.C.2, the Boston Medical NLRB majority in fact directly quoted
the Regents decision as support for its own decision.20 1 With this
194. See supra notes 88-90, 112-15, 165 and accompanying text.
195. Regents, 41 Cal. 3d at 623, 715 P.2d at 604, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
196. Id., 715 P.2d at 604-05, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 645-46 (citation omitted).
197. See supra notes 118-23, 166 and accompanying text.
198. See Regents, 41 Cal. 3d at 623, 715 P.2d at 605, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
199. Id.
200. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
201. See Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 1999 WL 1076118,
at *21 (Nov. 26, 1999).
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reference to Regents, the NLRB invited reference to other California
decisions, particularly those applying Regents to TAs and RAs, as
support for granting or denying the TAs and RAs in Yale and New
York University collective bargaining rights. These California deci-
sions are discussed next.
2. Berkeley
Medical house staff such as those involved in Regents, who al-
ready have their doctorates, are in a different situation than TAs and
RAs, who are still working towards their degree, and who are the fo-
cus of this Comment. The policy prong of the HEERA test was first
applied to TAs and RAs in Association of Graduate Student Employ-
ees v. PERB.2 °2 There, about 2400 graduate student TAs and 1600
graduate student RAs at the University of California, Berkeley,
sought union representation for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing.20 3 The TAs were responsible for fifty-eight percent of the class
meetings in lower-division classes.20 4 Only 16 out of 101 depart-
ments required that graduate students teach undergraduate courses,
20 5
and according to one witness, sixty percent of the large departments
and forty percent of the small departments hired TAs from outside
their departments.20 6
Accordingly, most TAs called as witnesses by the union testified
that they took employment in order to earn enough money to support
themselves during graduate school,20 7 that is, for primarily economic
rather than academic purposes. TA (as well as RA) positions were
awarded on the basis of academic merit rather than economic
need.20 8 TAs (and RAs) received only limited fringe benefits, and
TA appointments were limited to fifty percent of full-time employ-
ment.20 9 University witnesses testified that teaching helped TAs to
master and review fundamentals, study new developments, and
202. 6 Cal. App. 4th 1133, 8 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1992) [hereinafter Berkeley].
203. See id. at 1136, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 1137, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
207. See id. at 1138, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
208. See id. at 1136, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
209. See id. at 1137, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
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acquire the skill of transmitting information to others.210 Although
some RAs performed only clerical duties which provided little bene-
fit to their education, and others performed research that did not di-
rectly relate to their own research and dissertation work, many RAs
performed research that provided them with some or all of the data
necessary for their dissertations.
211
On these facts, the PERB decided that neither TAs nor RAs
were employees within the meaning of HEERA.212 The court of ap-
peals subsequently found that the PERB had misconstrued the bal-
ancing prong of the HEERA test.213 However, the court also found
that the PERB had correctly applied the policy prong of the HEERA
test and therefore upheld the PERB's decision to deny both TAs and
RAs collective bargaining rights.214 In particular, the court found
that the PERB's conclusion that coverage of TAs and RAs under
HEERA would not further the purposes of HEERA was supported by
substantial evidence on the whole record and that this conclusion,
therefore, had to be upheld.215 In HEERA, the legislature declared,
"The people of the State of California have a fundamental interest in
the development of harmonious and cooperative labor relations be-
tween the public institutions of higher education and their employ-
ees."21 6 HEERA further states: "It is the policy of the State of Cali-
fornia to encourage the pursuit of excellence in teaching, research,
and learning through the free exchange of ideas among the faculty,
students, and staff' of the covered institutions. 217 The PERB con-
cluded that coverage of TAs and RAs would not further these pur-
poses because
(1) the mentor relationship between professors and students
would be damaged; (2) it might interfere with the Univer-
sity's use of employment opportunities to attract the most
qualified students; (3) it could create arbitrary distinctions
210. See id. at 1138, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 1135, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
213. See id. at 1141-44, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 279-82.
214. See id. at 1144-48, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 282-84.
215. Seeid. at 1148, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
216. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3560(a) (West 1998).
217. Id. § 3561(c).
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between the work conditions for graduate students working
for pay and those doing unpaid research; (4) it could inter-
fere with the selection procedures for instructors and re-
searchers, causing economic considerations to replace aca-
demic considerations; (5) it would split employed graduate
students into two competing labor groups, [TAs] and [RAs],
and undermine the harmony of the present situation; [and]
(6) the free exchange of ideas would be sacrificed by bar-
gaining because economic issues and academic issues could
not be separated.218
The appellate court found these concerns, which echoed concerns
raised and rejected earlier in Regents in connection with medical
house staff,219 "reasonable" in connection with TAs and RAs.
220
However, half a decade later, the PERB effectively reversed the de-
cision underlying Berkeley by holding in the two decisions discussed
in the next subsection that coverage under HEERA of TAs but not
RAs, in circumstances similar to those involved in Berkeley, would
further the purposes of HEERA.
3. UCSD221 and UCLA
222
The PERB recently revisited the issue of student employees in
two related decisions involving recognition requests by unions seek-
ing to represent student employees at the San Diego and Los Angeles
campuses of the University of California.
In UCSD, students employed as readers, tutors, and associates
(collectively TAs) sought union representation for the purposes of
collective bargaining.
223
218. Berkeley, 6 Cal. App. 4th at 1145, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
219. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
220. Berkeley, 6 Cal. App. 4th at 1145, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
221. Association of Student Employees, 22 PERC 29084 (Cal. Pub. Em-
ployment Relations Bd. 1998) [hereinafter UCSD 1]; Association of Student
Employees, 22 PERC 29152 (Cal. Pub. Employment Relations Bd. 1998)
[hereinafter UCSD I1].
222. Student Ass'n of Graduate Employees, 23 PERC 30065 (Cal. Pub.
Employment Relations Bd. 1999); Student Ass'n of Graduate Employees, 23
PERC 30025 (Cal. Pub. Employment Relations Bd. 1998); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 20 PERC 27129 (Cal. Pub. Employment Relations Bd. A.L.J.
1996).
223. See UCSD 1, 22 PERC 29084, at 348.
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Readers assist in teaching by "reading and grading homework
assignments, quizzes, mid-term and final exams and papers."
224
From the fall of 1993 through the fall of 1994, there were 681 under-
graduate, 376 graduate, and 21 nonstudent readers.
225
While most tutors do one-on-one or group tutoring within a pro-
gram designed to maximize student performance and retention, a
significant minority in this group work as undergraduate TAs within
various departments where they meet with students during office
hours, lead discussion and review sessions, and help grade exams.
226
From the fall of 1993 through the fall of 1995, there were 879 under-
graduate, 203 graduate, and 173 nonstudent tutors.
227
Associates teach a course for which they have the same respon-
sibilities regular faculty members have when teaching the course, in-
cluding selecting textbooks and reading lists, preparing and deliver-
ing lectures, holding office hours, designing all course assignments
and exams, and grading.22 8 All associates are graduate students. 2 9
Graduate students holding any combination of reader, tutor, or
associate positions in excess of twenty-five percent of a full-time po-
sition receive, in addition to pay, health insurance, and registration
and educational fee remissions.230 Undergraduate and nonstudent
employees receive neither of these two additional benefits.23'
The PERB majority concluded, under the contingency and the
relatedness prongs of the HEERA test, that the employment of stu-
dents as readers, tutors, and associates was contingent on their status
as students, and that the services they provide were related to their
educational objectives, the most fundamental of which was "to be-
come educated-to learn and master a subject matter or field of
study.
2 3 2
Next, the PERB majority concluded under the balancing prong
of the HEERA test that these educational objectives were
224. Id. at 364.
225. See id. at 365.
226. See id. at 368.
227. See id. at 371.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 365.
231. See id.
232. Id. at 351.
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subordinate to the services performed by TAs.233 This conclusion of
law was based on earlier findings of fact by the AD which the PERB
majority adopted as its own.
With respect to the first category of TAs, the ALJ found that
"first and foremost, readers are looking for an opportunity to gener-
ate income." 234 The PERB majority agreed, adding that "the value
and effectiveness of employment as a reader does not appear to be
substantial in meeting students' educational objectives. ' 235 Since, on
the other hand, "the value and effectiveness of the services provided
by readers are essential to the University's educational mission," the
PERB majority concluded that "the educational objectives of readers
are subordinate to the services they perform."
236
Regarding the second category of TAs, the ALJ found that
"[w]hile generating income was a common theme, it was not as uni-
versal a primary motive [for tutors] as it was for readers. 237 Never-
theless, the ALJ listed economic reasons as the first (and thus argua-
bly overall most important) of various factors motivating students to
seek employment as tutors, and did not suggest any other "common
theme," let alone another "universal primary motive."238 The PERB
majority again agreed, pointing to testimony by tutors that "while
obtaining an income was a motivating factor in seeking a tutor posi-
tion, serving as a tutor helped them achieve certain educational ob-
jectives., 239 Since, however, "tutors are absolutely vital to the Uni-
versity's ability to fulfill its teaching mission," the PERB majority
concluded once more that "the educational objectives of student tu-
tors are subordinate to the services they perform."
240
Regarding the third and last category of TAs, the ALJ found that
"associates are motivated to take the associate job for three main rea-
sons[:] to build their teaching skills and gain teaching experience, to
add teaching experience to their curriculum vitaes, and to generate
233. See id. at 352.
234. Id. at 367 (emphasis omitted).
235. Id. at 352.
236. Id. (emphasis added).
237. Id. at 370.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 352.
240. Id. (emphasis added).
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income. ' 241 Although the ALJ listed economic reasons last among
the factors motivating students to seek employment as associates,
and the PERB majority found that "[e]mployment as an associate
meets several educational objectives, such as providing students with
teaching skills and experience,"2 42 the PERB majority, nevertheless,
concluded that "the educational objectives of associates are subordi-
nate to the services they provide to the University" because "[tihe
employment of associates is necessary to meet the service needs of
the University."
243
Finally, the PERB majority concluded under the policy prong of
the HEERA test that coverage of TAs would further the purposes of
HEERA.244 In doing so, the PERB majority effectively reversed its
decision underlying Berkeley,245 and rejected renewed arguments that
"granting collective bargaining rights to these student employees
would interfere with academic policy and result in difficult and pro-
tracted efforts to define the scope of representation in relation to aca-
demic matters. ' 246 The PERB majority pointed out that "[t]he Re-
gents court characterized similar arguments by the University in that
case as a 'doomsday cry' which was 'somewhat exaggerated' and
'premature."' 247 The PERB majority further reasoned that various
safeguards and exclusions contained in HEERA adequately ad-
dressed the university's concerns. 24 8 As a result of these safeguards
and exclusions, coverage of TAs would not stand in the way of
HEERA's purpose to develop "harmonious and cooperative labor
241. Id. at 372.
242. Id. at 352.
243. Id. (emphasis added).
244. See id. at 355.
245. The UCSD I PERB majority, however, noted that "[t]he Board's deci-
sion [underlying Berkeley] was based on conditions and job duties existing on
the UC Berkeley campus in 1984. We do not find those conditions and duties,
or the Board decision based on them, determinative of the status of student
employees at UCSD more than a decade later." Id. at 353.
246. Id. at 354.
247. Id.
248. See id. HEERA, for example, provides that the scope of representation
shall not include "[a]dmission requirements for students, conditions for the
award of certificates and degrees to students, and the content and supervision
of courses, curricula, and research programs . C..." GAL. GOV'T CODE §
3562(q)(1)(C) (West Supp. 2000).
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relations" and encourage "excellence in teaching, research, and
learning."2 49 On the contrary, coverage of these student employees
would further HEERA's purpose to "permit the full participation by
employees in the determination of the conditions of their employ-
ment by providing for a system of collective bargaining" and "to es-
tablish a process designed to promote the orderly resolution of dis-
putes. ' ' 5° Thus, coverage does not impede, but rather furthers, the
purposes of HEERA. Since TAs passed both the third and fourth
prong of the third part of the HEERA test, the PERB majority held
that they were employees within the meaning of that act.
251
The PERB reached a similar result in UCLA,252 where students
employed as graduate student researchers (RAs), graduate student in-
structors, readers, special readers, tutors, and remedial tutors (collec-
tively TAs) sought union representation for the purpose of collective
bargaining.25
3
At UCLA, the vast majority of RAs hold half-time positions that
are attached to certain research grants, mostly in the sciences and en-
gineering fields.2 5 4  Newly-admitted RAs might first perform re-
search of a very basic nature to learn standard laboratory skills and
also to assist faculty members, postdoctoral researchers, and more
advanced students. 5 Later, RAs conduct more advanced research in
their dissertation chair's lab. RAs often co-author research papers
with their dissertation chairs; this not only helps to build the RA's
curriculum vitae but the research papers may sometimes also be re-
worked into the RA's dissertation. 6 A small minority of RAs hold
hourly positions performing work for a faculty member who
249. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3560(a), 3561(c) (West 1998).
250. UCSD I, 22 PERC 29084, at 353 (citing CAL. Gov'T CODE §§
3560(e), 3561(a).
251. See id. at 348.
252. Student Ass'n of Graduate Employees, 23 PERC 30065 (Cal. Pub.
Employment Relations Bd. 1999) [hereinafter UCLA II1]; Student Ass'n of
Graduate Employees, 23 PERC 30025 (Cal. Pub. Employment Relations Bd.
1998) [hereinafter UCLA 11]; Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 20 PERC 27129
(Cal. Pub. Employment Relations Bd. A.L.J. 1996) [hereinafter UCLA 1].
253. See UCLA I, 20 PERC 1 27129, at 424-25.
254. See id. at 425.
255. See id. at 426.
256. See id.
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requires research for a book or other special project; such work is not
tied to the student's own dissertation or course work.
257
Graduate student instructors hold half- or part-time appoint-
ments teaching courses or leading discussion or lab sections.
2 5 8
Where graduate student instructors teach courses, their responsibili-
ties are comparable to those of associates at UCSD.25 9 Almost all
Spanish I through IV, ninety percent of English IV-critical reading
and writing-and sixty percent of English IHI-writing, composition,
rhetoric, and language-courses are taught by graduate student in-
structors.26° Where graduate student instructors lead discussion or
lab sections, they explain or augment materials introduced during
larger lecture classes by faculty. They also meet with students dur-
ing office hours, hold review sessions, and assign and grade home-
work assignments and projects which are usually based upon general
guidelines determined by the faculty member teaching the course.
26 1
Special readers usually function in much the same way as
graduate student instructors except that they work in upper division
or graduate courses.262
Remedial tutors conduct review sessions, do one-on-one tutor-
ing and work in small groups with first year medical students.
263
They also show pre-med students how to study the medical curricu-
lum and teach undergraduate students subjects which are prerequi-
sites to medical school.264 Hired to teach learning and communica-
tion skills, as well as personal and career development, remedial
tutors set the curriculum; develop a syllabus; develop, administer,
and grade assignments and exams; and evaluate the students' per-
formance.265 Some remedial tutors are nonstudents who typically
have an advanced degree in the relevant subject area and who
257. See id. at 425.
258. See id. at 426.
259. See id.; supra note 228 and accompanying text.
260. See UCLA 1, 20 PERC 27129, at 426.
261. See id. at 427.
262. See id. at 428.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See id.
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often have teaching experience at the community college or univer-
sity level.266
The reader and tutor positions at UCLA are virtually identical to
the same positions at UCSD.267 Readers are usually graduate or un-
dergraduate students; most tutors are undergraduate students.268
Student employees in all of these categories receive graduate
student health insurance and are eligible for registration and educa-
tional fee remissions.
269
The PERB majority concluded in UCLA, as it had done in
UCSD, under the contingency and relatedness prongs of the HEERA
test, that the employment of students in all of these positions was
contingent on their status as students and that the services provided
by them were related to their educational objectives.2
Next, the PERB majority adopted the AL's conclusion under
the balancing prong of the HEERA test that the educational objec-
tives of TAs, but not those of RAs, were subordinate to the services
they provided.271 In UCLA, the AL's findings of fact were, if any-
thing, more central to the PERB's holding than they had been in
UCSD.
With respect to RAs, the ALJ found that employment, in that
category "meets practically every educational objective that students
,, 272possess. In particular, RAs "learn[] the very skills essential for
them to complete their dissertation and obtain their degree,... per-
form duties leading directly to their dissertation and degree[,] and re-
ceive[] pay as a means of support for a fungible portion of that
work., 273 Because "the value of [RA] positions accrue [sic] primar-
ily to the [RA~s and their educational objectives" and "[t]he value of
the services received by the University is not nearly as significant,"
the ALJ concluded that "services provided to the University are sub-
ordinate to the educational objectives of most [RA]s." 274 Since the
266. See id.
267. See id. at 428-29; see also supra notes 224, 226 and accompanying text.
268. See UCLA I, 20 PERC 27129, at 429.
269. See id. at 425.
270. See UCLA II, 23 PERC 30025, at 85.
271. See id. at 83, 86; see also UCLA I, 20 PERC 27129, at 441, 443.
272. UCLA 1, 20 PERC 27129, at 440.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 440-41 (emphasis added). The ALJ noted that the limited number
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union did not offer any exceptions to this finding, the PERB adopted
it without discussion.
With respect to TAs, the ALl found "employment in the dis-
puted titles does very little or nothing at all in meeting the most fun-
damental educational objective of all student employees, which is to
complete their degree program." 275 In light of "[t]he inadequacy of
employment in these titles to meet educational objectives," the ALJ
concluded that "[m]ost individuals in these classifications are drawn
to their jobs for economic reasons."276 Balancing "[t]he limited
value that employment in these titles has in meeting [the student's]
educational objectives" against "the great value of services provided
[by TAs] to the University," which "could not continue in its current
structure without the services of the disputed titles," 277 the ALJ con-
cluded that "the educational objectives of [TAs] ... are subordinate
to the services received by the University." 278 The university ex-
cepted to this finding, but the PERB majority adopted it without
much discussion, observing that "the services performed by [TAs]
are vital to the University and must be performed without regard to
whether they provide any educational benefit to student employ-
ees."
279
Finally, the PERB majority adopted the ALl's conclusion, under
the policy prong of the HEERA test, that coverage of TAs, but not
RAs, would further the purposes of HEERA.28°
Regarding the majority of RAs whose educational objectives
were not subordinate to the services they provided, the ALJ found it
unnecessary to decide whether coverage of these RAs would further
the purposes of HEERA.28' With respect to the limited number of
hourly RAs not working in their field of study, 282 the ALJ felt that
it would not further the purposes of [HEERA] to... pro-
of hourly TAs not working in their field of study, see supra note 257 and ac-
companying text, might be an exception to this conclusion. See UCLA I, 20
PERC 27129, at 441.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
278. Id. at 443.
279. UCLA II, 23 PERC 30025, at 86 (emphasis added).
280. See id. at 83, 88; see also UCLA I, 20 PERC 27129, at 444, 449.
281. See UCLA I, 20 PERC 27129, at 443.
282. See supra note 257.
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vide coverage to [these RA]s . . . because there is no ad-
ministratively practical method for the parties to clearly and
easily determine on a person-by-person, hour-by-hour basis
which hourly [RA]s might be subject to coverage, and be-
cause this group constitutes a small portion of the total ex-
pended [RA] funds.
283
Since the union did not challenge this finding, the PERB, as before,
adopted it without discussion.
284
With respect to TAs, the ALJ concluded that "it would further
the purposes of [HEERA] to extend coverage to the employees in
question," 285 and the PERB majority adopted this conclusion for
much the same reasons as those discussed above in connection with
the UCSD decision.286 In doing so, the PERB majority relied some-
what more heavily on the Regents decision than it had in UCSD: "In
considering similar arguments by the University, the court in Regents
characterized the arguments as a 'doomsday cry' which was 'some-
what exaggerated' and 'premature.' Moreover, the court held that
'The argument basically concerns the appropriate scope of repre-
sentation."'28 7 The PERB majority then referred to the same statu-
tory safeguards and exclusions regarding the scope of student em-
ployee representation which it had already referred to in UCSD and
concluded, as before, that these safeguards and exclusions would en-
sure that coverage of TAs under HEERA would further the purposes
of that act.288 Since TAs, but not RAs, passed both the third and the
fourth prong of the HEERA test, the PERB majority held that TAs,
but not RAs, were employees under that act.
289
283. UCLA 1, 20 PERC 27129, at 444. The Regional Director in New York
University, on the other hand, included in the bargaining unit created in that
case those RAs who provided compensated services and excluded from it those
RAs who did not. See supra notes 163-64, 169 and accompanying text.
284. See UCLA 11, 23 PERC 30025, at 83.
285. UCLA , 20 PERC 27129, at 449.
286. See UCLA II, 23 PERC 30025, at 88; see also supra notes 247-50 and
accompanying text.
287. UCLA 11, 23 PERC 30025, at 87 (emphasis added).
288. See id. at 88; see also supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
289. See UCLA II, 23 PERC 30025, at 83, 88.
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The PERB subsequently declined to join the university in seek-
ing judicial review of the UCSD and UCLA decisions.290 Faced with
pressure from a newly-elected state legislature whose leaders "made
clear to university officials that if the dispute remained unresolved it
would adversely affect state funds for the university's budget,"2 91 the
university then decided not to challenge the PERB decisions in state
court.292 Instead, the university decided to accept the outcome of
union elections not only at UCSD and UCLA, but also at the other
UC campuses: UC Davis and UC Santa Barbara, for which union
recognition requests were pending before the PERB,293 and UC Ir-
vine, UC Riverside, UC Santa Cruz, and UC Berkeley, for which ap-
parently no such requests were pending. By the end of June 1999,
TAs at all eight campuses had voted in favor of union representation,
and collective bargaining got underway.294 In March 2000, the union
290. See UCSD 11, 22 PERC 29152; UCLA 111, 23 PERC 30065.
291. Graduate Students at Six Campuses of University of California Vote for
UAW, DAILY LABOR REP., June 22, 1999, at A4 (hereinafter Graduate Stu-
dents).
292. California thus joined the growing number of states that allow student
employees at public universities to bargain collectively. By one recent count,
student employee unions were recognized at the University of Florida, the
University of South Florida, the University of Iowa, the University of Kansas,
the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, the University of Massachusetts at
Lowell, the State University of New York, the University of Michigan, the
University of Oregon at Eugene, Rutgers University, the University of Wis-
consin at Milwaukee, and the University of Wisconsin at Madison. See David
L. Gregory, The Problematic Employment Dynamics of Student Internships, 12
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 227, 250 (1998). Some states, such
as New York, extended collective bargaining rights to student employees in the
same way as California, namely via rulings of state labor relations boards. See
Streitz & Hunider, supra note 5, at 357 n.50. In other states, such as Illinois,
the state legislature is in the process of amending the state labor law to clarify
that graduate student employees have employee rights. See Amanda Criner,
Illinois House Passes Unionizing Bill for Graduate Student Employees, U-
WIRE, Mar. 22, 1999. In yet other states, such as Wisconsin, graduate student
employees gained collective bargaining rights themselves through strikes and
without judicial or legislative assistance. See Gregory, supra, at 249-50. Suc-
cess of graduate student employee unionizing at public universities is, how-
ever, by no means universal. Graduate student employees at the University of
Minnesota, for example, voted down union representation three times. See HR
ON CAMPUS, July 1, 1999.
293. See UCLA I, 20 PERC 27129, at 426.
294. See Graduate Students, supra note 291, at A4.
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charged that the university had violated its duty to bargain in good
faith295 and TAs at all eight campuses authorized a strike in protest of
this unfair labor practice that was to commence on March 17,
2000.2 96 One day before the strike date, the union agreed to a three-
week truce during which the parties would try to resolve their differ-
ences with the help of a mediator appointed by California Governor
Gray Davis.297 After renewed strike threats,298 both sides reached an
agreement on May 10, 2000, which among other things provides for
a seven and a half percent pay raise over three years and a waiver of
the cost of attending UCLA by 2002.299
IV. UNDER FEDERAL AND CALIFORNIA LAW, TAs SHOULD HAVE THE
RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
A. Introduction
This Part argues that under the federal law summarized in Part I
as informed by the California law summarized in Part I11, the NLRB
should grant the TAs and RAs involved in Yale and New York Uni-
versity the right to bargain collectively. Section B argues that all
TAs and some RAs are employees within the meaning of the NLRA
under both the new service test and the old primary purpose test.
Section C argues that coverage of these TAs and RAs under the
NLRA will not violate the public policies behind the NLRA because
collective bargaining over terms and conditions of their employment
will not infringe upon purely academic matters and because coverage
of these TAs and RAs will actually reduce the number of TA and RA
strikes.
California law should inform the application of federal law to
the Yale and NYU TAs and RAs for three reasons. First,
295. See supra notes 27, 31 and accompanying text.
296. See Jeff Ristine, Student Aides at UC Call Walkout: Timing Would Dis-
rupt Grading of Exams, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 14, 2000, at A3.
297. See Kenneth R. Weiss, UC's Teaching Assistants Postpone Strike, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2000, at A3.
298. See Tanya Schevitz, UC Grad Assistants Threaten to Strike After Talks
Hit Snag, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 3, 2000, at A5.
299. See Meredith May, UC Grad Students Reach Labor Deal, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., May 11, 2000, at A8.
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California's HEERA test represents a compromise between the new
service test and the old primary purpose test;300 therefore, California
law is especially relevant for the application of either of these two
federal tests. Moreover, HEERA-governed California public em-
ployees, like NLRA-governed private employees but unlike most
other state law-governed public employees, have the right to
strike,30 1 and granting student employees collective bargaining rights
under HEERA has, therefore, at least some of the consequences of
doing the same under the NLRA. Second, as discussed below, the
NLRB already looked to California law for support for its decision to
grant the house staff involved in Boston Medical the right to bargain
collectively.30 2 Logic dictates that it should do the same in the case
of the Yale and NYU TAs and RAs. Third, there are other indica-
tions that the NLRB will in fact take guidance from California law
when it decides the fate of the Yale and NYU TAs and RAs. Thus
former NLRB Member William Gould IV, who brought the Yale
case before the NLRB, apparently believes that "[a]lthough recent
legal victories for graduate students in California are matters of state
law,
... these cases will be cited when the NLRB rules on the issue," and
that "[t]heoretically, the cases could be used to establish that gradu-
ate student unions do not interfere with the goals of education
,,303
B. TAs Are Employees Within the Meaning of the NLRA
1. Under the service test, TAs are employees because they provide
compensated services
As mentioned above, under the service test first developed in
Member Fanning's Cedars-Sinai dissent and later adopted by the
Boston Medical NLRB majority, anyone who provides compensated
services is an employee within the meaning of the NLRA.304 The
300. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
301. See infra Part IV.C.3.
302. See infra note 372 and accompanying text.
303. Michael Kelly, Grad Student Unionization: The Fight for Yale's Fu-
ture, YALE DAILY NEws, Apr. 14, 1999, available in 1999 WL 15036898.
304. See supra notes 93-94, 108 and accompanying text.
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NLRB should now apply this test to the Yale and NYU TAs and RAs
and conclude that they are employees.
Boston Medical, like Cedars-Sinai, "is primarily a decision
about students,"30 5 that is TAs and RAs as well as medical house
staff. The Boston Medical NLRB said, "Review of our decisions
concerning students does not lead to a different result. In prior cases,
there has been no question that students are statutory employees.
Rather, the issue has been the eligibility of student workers based on
community of interest considerations." 30 6 Although the NLRB does
not cite to any cases, it is clear from the context that it is referring to
student employees other than medical house staff. The NLRB thus
based its decision in Boston Medical, a case involving medical house
staff, on decisions in cases involving student employees other than
medical house staff. By the same token, the NLRB should now base
its decisions in Yale and New York University, cases involving stu-
dent employees other than medical house staff, on the medical house
staff case Boston Medical. Accordingly, it should apply here the
service test for employee status which it adopted there. Furthermore,
an application of this test to the Yale and NYU TAs and RAs should
come to the conclusion that they are statutory employees.
30 7
Yale part-time acting instructors independently develop and
teach their own courses. 30 8 Other Yale TAs assist faculty in the un-
dergraduate programs by doing the following: conducting discussion
305. St. Clare's Hosp. and Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1000 (1977).
306. Boston Medical Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 1999 WL 1076118, at
*16 (Nov. 26, 1999) (emphasis added). This generalization is not entirely cor-
rect, as should be clear from the earlier discussion of Leland Stanford. See su-
pra notes 63-68 and accompanying text; see also San Francisco Art Inst., 226
N.L.R.B. 1251 (1976) (student workers whose work is incidental to academic
objectives are not employees).
307. After Boston Medical, the NLRB seems predisposed to find TAs to be
statutory employees. As one commentator with decidedly anti-union views
wrote: "While [Yale] is yet to be decided, it appears clear that the NLRB has
extended its grasp to encompass students who perform work as part of their
graduate educational programs .... [Boston Medical and Yale] may suggest
that the once hallowed ground of academia is no longer spared from unions'
infiltration." Ursula L. Haerter, NLRB Stretches its Jurisdictional Muscles,
CONN. EMPLOYMENT L. LETTER, Jan. 2000.
308. See Yale Univ., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 1999 WL 1076166, at *13 (Nov.
29, 1999).
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sections and pre-examination reviews; meeting individually with
students; helping to prepare quizzes, problem sets, and examinations;
and assigning, correcting, and grading papers and exams. 309 Since
they are better acquainted with the students than are the professors,
TAs also write letters of recommendation when requested by the stu-
dents.310 According to a study commissioned by the TA union, nine
percent of courses have a graduate student's name listed as the pri-
mary instructor, forty percent of classroom contact hours between
student and instructor involve TAs, and ninety and ninety-six percent
of the grading in the history and chemistry departments, respectively,
is done by TAs.311 With a few limited exceptions, service as a TA is
not a degree requirement in any educational discipline. 312 The situa-
tion is similar at NYU, where TAs help professors teach classes
313
or, in a significant number of cases, teach classes on their own,
314
and where such service is a degree requirement only in a few de-
partments.
315
The ALJ who first heard the Yale case found in his decision that
although TAs "gain valuable teaching experience... [,] the material
they teach is generally more basic than the work they are doing to-
ward their doctorate. ,,316 In some cases, students in professional
schools such as law or architecture, which usually lead to non-
teaching careers, taught outside their professional schools. 317 Given
the limited educational value of TA service to the TAs themselves, it
is not surprising that the amount of time a student may spend in
teaching is expressly limited by the university's policies.318 The Au
concluded that "[h]owever significant their teaching functions may
be to their own educational progress and career plans, it is abun-
dantly clear that the [TAs] are a major resource for the University in
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See Graduate Employees and Students Org., supra note 4.
312. See Yale, 1999 WL 1076166, at *12.
313. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
316. Yale, 1999 WL 1076166, at *13.
317. See id.
318. See id. at *12.
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providing undergraduate education. ' 319 For their services, the TAs
are compensated based, at least in part, on the approximate amount
of time and effort required.32 ° Similarly, the NYU TA union asserted
that TAs (as well as RAs) there "often teach outside of their areas of
academic concentration" and "teach courses or perform duties which
involve skills and content with which they are already fully versed"
and that these positions "often interfere with rather than enhance the
graduate students' academic programs." 321 Without evaluating this
assertion, the Regional Director found that "it is clear that TAs 'play
a large role in the undergraduate educational experience at NYU'
because "TAs teach a significant number of NYU's courses" which
would otherwise have to be taught by "instructors who may be
statutory employees."
322
On these facts, the conclusion is inescapable that Yale and NYU
TAs provide services to their universities for which they are compen-
sated. While the ALJ in Yale remained silent on this issue, the Re-
gional Director in New York University reached precisely this con-
clusion323 and ruled that under the service test, they are, therefore,
employees within the meaning of the NLRA.324 The ALJ's conclu-
sion that the services of Yale TAs are "a major resource for the Uni-
versity in providing undergraduate education ' 325 echoes the Califor-
nia PERB's conclusion that the services of UCSD and UCLA TAs
are "essential to the University's educational mission, ' ' 326 "absolutely
vital to the University's ability to fulfill its teaching mission,'
327
319. Id. at *13 (emphasis added).
320. See id. at *12.
321. New York Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-22, E-30 (NLRB Apr. 3,
2000).
322. Id. at E-31 (quoting the NYU "Handbook for Teaching Assistant"
[sic]).
323. "The [TAs and RAs] perform services under the control and direction
of the Employer, in exchange for compensation." Id.
324. "[I]t is clear that the [TAs and RAs] sought by the Petitioner meet the
statutory definition of employee under Section 2(2) of the Act." Id. (citing 29
U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988)).
325. Yale, 1999 WL 1076166, at *13.
326. Association of Student Employees, 22 PERC 29084, at 352 (Cal. Pub.
Employment Relations Bd. 1998) [hereinafter UCSD 1].
327. Id.
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"necessary to meet the service needs of the University,' 328 and "vital
to the University." 329 The PERB therefore held that the UCSD and
UCLA TAs performed services for the university whose value to the
university outweighed the TAs' educational objectives. Surely the
NLRB must hold here on largely identical facts 330 that the Yale and
NYU TAs are also performing services for the university. Since
these services are compensated, the Yale and NYU TAs are employ-
ees within the meaning of the NLRA.
According to Jane Clark Schnabel, Assistant General Counsel
for the Regional Advice Branch of the NLRB, the NLRB considers
the Yale TAs to be employed by Yale in areas unrelated to their
graduate programs, 331 i.e., away from their own education. Since
their studies do not directly benefit from such employment, it can be
argued that the Yale TAs always perform a service for the university
rather than for themselves and are therefore always employees within
the meaning of the NLRA under the service test.
The situation is more complex for RAs. Regarding those RAs
whom the union in New York University sought to represent, the Re-
gional Director observed that "[a]s in the case of TAs, ... RAs are
required to perform certain services in exchange for their stipend and
tuition remission ' 332 and concluded that like TAs, they were there-
fore statutory employees. 333 These NYU RAs are like the small mi-
nority of UCLA RAs whose work was not tied to their own disserta-
tion or course work and whom the ALJ in UCLA mentioned as a
possible exception to his conclusion that UCLA RAs were not em-
ployees within the meaning of HiEERA.334  These RAs should
328. Id.
329. Student Ass'n of Graduate Employees, 23 PERC 30025, at 86 (Cal.
Pub. Employment Relations Bd. 1998) [hereinafter UCLA I1].
330. Compare the description of the duties of the Yale TAs in the previous
paragraph with that of the UCSD and UCLA TAs in supra notes 224, 226, 228,
258-65, 267 and accompanying text.
331. See Ukeiley, supra note 7, at 560.
332: New York Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-25; see also supra note
323.
333. See supra note 324.
334. See supra notes 257, 276 and accompanying text.
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generally also be recognized as employees within the meaning of the
NLRA under the service test.
335
On the other hand, regarding those RAs whom the union in New
York University did not seek to represent, the Regional Director ob-
served that these RAs "are not required to perform specific services"
for NYU 336 and concluded that they were therefore not statutory em-
ployees. 337 These RAs are like the majority of UCLA RAs whose
work was tied to their own dissertation or course work. Regarding
these RAs, the ALJ in UCLA found on the one hand that "the value
of [their] positions accrue [sic] primarily to the [RA]s" 338 and on the
other hand that "[t]he value of the services received by the Univer-
sity is not nearly as significant" and concluded that these RAs were
therefore not employees under the HEERA balancing test.339 These
RAs are also like the RAs in Leland Stanford who performed re-
search required by their program that ultimately led towards their
thesis and degree and who sought to form a bargaining unit of their
own.340  The NLRB rejected this request, ostensibly applying the
primary purpose test, but it also said that "the relationship of the
RA's and Stanford is not grounded on the performance of a given
task where both the task and the time of its performance is desig-
nated and controlled by an employer., 341 This is the language of the
service test, not the primary purpose test.342 In his Cedars-Sinai dis-
sent, Member Fanning put the matter more clearly:
The research they conducted was thesis oriented, that is to
335. There may, however, be other reasons to exclude even these RAs from
coverage. For example, the UCLA ALJ felt that it was impracticable to deter-
mine which RAs fell into the category deserving HEERA coverage and which
did not. See supra note 285 and accompanying text. On the other hand, the
New York University Regional Director made precisely this determination, ex-
tending NLRA coverage to some RAs but not others. See supra notes 163-64,
169-70 and accompanying text.
336. New York Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-25 n.19.
337. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
338. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 20 PERC 27129, at 440 (Cal. Pub. Em-
ployment Relations Bd. A.L.J. 1996) [hereinafter UCLA 1].
339. Id.
340. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
341. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621, 623 (1974) (emphasis
added).
342. See supra notes 93, 108 and accompanying text.
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say,.., the research assistants did not perform a servicefor
Stanford .... They performed that research for themselves.
In terms of the actual research conducted, Stanford was, es-
sentially, a disinterested party. Stanford did not control the
research .... All of which is to say,.., the research assis-
tants did not work for the alleged employer and, therefore,
were not employees.
343
These RAs are thus not employees within the meaning of the NLRA
under the service test because they do not provide compensated
services in the required sense.
344
343. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 255 n.14 (1976) (Fanning,
Member, dissenting).
344. Ironically, NYU argued that the RAs whom the union in New York Uni-
versity did not seek to represent "do perform services for the University in that
they help NYU fulfill its obligations under the research grant" and "otherwise
enhance NYU's reputation as a research university." New York Univ., 66
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-32 n.50. The university raised this argument in
support of its assertion that if any TA or RA bargaining unit were to be cre-
ated, the only appropriate unit would be one including all TAs and RAs. See
id. at E-22. Behind this assertion lurks presumably the university's hope that
an election would be harder to win in such a larger unit. The Regional Direc-
tor, however, flatly rejected the university's argument by stating that "all of
this... is not directly relevant to the inquiry of whether or not an individual is
providing services to the Employer under its control in exchange for compen-
sation." Id. at E-32 n.50. Nevertheless, the argument is far from frivolous.
Given its complexity, I will not pursue this argument in this Comment.
It could also be argued that RAs, like TAs, are apprentices or trainees,
whom the NLRB has generally considered as employees. See Shorb, supra
note 189, at 1071 & n.124 (citing United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 333 F.2d
819 (2d Cir. 1964) (trainees); General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 1063
(1961) (apprentices)). For example, Yale Graduate School Dean Thomas Ap-
pelquist claims that "working as a teaching assistant 'is a kind of apprentice-
ship."' Grad Students Plan Walkout to Seek Recognition as a Union, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1995, at A42. Similarly, state courts have supported the classi-
fication of medical house staff as employees with the observation that
"[m]embers of all professions continue their learning throughout their careers.
For example, fledgling lawyers employed by a law firm spend a great deal of
time acquiring new skills, yet no one would contend that they are not employ-
ees of the law firm." Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Employment Relations
Comm'n, 204 N.W.2d 218, 226 (Mich. 1973) (cited in House Officers Ass'n
for the Univ. of Neb. Med. Ctr. v. University of Neb. Med. Ctr., 255 N.W.2d
258, 262 (Neb. 1977)). On the other hand, commentator Jennifer A. Shorb
suggests that "[a]rguably, apprentices are distinguishable from students," al-
though she does not supply any arguments in support of this suggestion.
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In conclusion, all TAs and some RAs perform compensated
services and are therefore employees within the meaning of the
NLRA under the service test. Other RAs, however, do not perform
such services and are therefore not employees.345
2. Under the primary purpose test, TAs are employees because they
take employment for primarily economic purposes
Should the NLRB or a court of appeals reject the service test
and apply the primary purpose test instead, the Yale and NYU TAs
and RAs are nevertheless employees within the meaning of the
NLRA because they take employment for primarily economic rather
than primarily educational purposes.
As pointed out by one pair of scholars, "[n]one of the NLRB de-
cisions regarding students at private educational institutions have
considered students within the classification of the Yale graduate as-
sistants." 346 In particular, the NLRB has never had before it a re-
quest by TAs to be recognized in a bargaining unit of their own.
Moreover, neither the ALJ or the NLRB in Yale nor the Regional Di-
rector in New York University made findings about the purposes for
which Yale and NYU graduate students take employment as TAs or
RAs. 3 4 7 Guidance can, however, be gleaned from the findings made
Shorb, supra note 189, at 1071. Like the argument sketched in the previous
paragraph, the argument outlined in this paragraph is complex and will not be
pursued in this Comment.
345. For comparisons of TAs and RAs reaching the same conclusion, see
Martin H. Malin, Student Employees and Collective Bargaining, 69 KY. L.J. 1,
33 (1980), and Streitz & Hunkler, supra note 5, at 372-73.
346. Streitz & Hunkler, supra note 5, at 370.
347. According to the NYU TA and RA union, "graduate students accept...
assistantships generally because they need the money." New York Univ., 66
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-30. Similarly, according to Professor Ukeiley,
"[former TA-union chairwoman] Robin Brown stated that a significant per-
centage of [TA-union] members accepted teaching responsibilities merely be-
cause they needed the money to pay for tuition and living expenses." Ukeiley,
supra note 7, at 563. From this, and the fact that TAs must complete their de-
gree to obtain full-time faculty positions at universities or colleges, Professor
Ukeiley concludes that "Yale graduate students are students primarily con-
cerned with completing their dissertation and supplementing their incomes,
and therefore,.., they are not entitled to coverage under the Act." Id. How-
ever, if Yale graduate students took employment as TAs "merely because they
needed the money" and for the purpose of "supplementing their incomes," this
would actually support the opposite conclusion under the primary purpose test,
June 2000] 1903
LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 33:1849
by the AD and adopted by the PERB in UCSD and UCLA about the
purposes for which students at these universities under similar cir-
cumstances take employment as TAs and RAs.
Most of the Yale and NYU TAs have duties that match those of
the readers in UCSD: They all assist in teaching by reading and
grading quizzes, papers, and exams.34 8 In reference to the UCSD
readers, the ALJ said (and the PERB agreed),349 "first andforemost,
readers are looking for an opportunity to generate income."350 In
other words, UCSD readers take employment primarily for economic
rather than educational purposes. It is reasonable to assume the same
for the similarly situated Yale and NYU TAs; therefore, the Yale and
NYU TAs are employees within the meaning of the NLRA under the
primary purpose test.
Yale and NYU TAs also have some of the duties of the UCSD
tutors: They all lead discussion and review sessions and meet indi-
vidually with students.351 The AD noted in UCSD I (and the PERB
again agreed)352 that "[w]hile generating income was a common
theme [for tutors], it was not as universal a primary motive as it was
for readers. 353 However, the ALJ listed economic reasons as the
first (and thus arguably overall most important) of the various factors
motivating UCSD students to seek employment as tutors. This sug-
gests that UCSD tutors and the similarly situated Yale and NYU TAs
take employment for primarily economic rather than educational rea-
sons and that they would be or are, respectively, employees within
the meaning of the NLRA under the primary purpose test.
Some Yale TAs, namely part-time acting instructors, and some
NYU TAs, primarily expository writing and foreign language in-
structors, have some of the duties of UCSD associates: They all in-
dependently develop and teach their own courses. 354 The ALJ stated
that is, Yale TAs take employment for primarily economic rather than primar-
ily educational reasons and are therefore entitled to coverage under the NLRA.
348. Compare supra notes 152, 309 and accompanying text, with supra note
224 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
350. UCSD I, 22 PERC 29084, at 367.
351. Compare supra notes 152, 309 and accompanying text, with supra note
226 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
353. UCSD I, 22 PERC 29084, at 370.
354. Compare supra notes 154, 308 and accompanying text, with supra note
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that UCSD "associates are motivated to take the associate job for
three main reasons: to build their teaching skills and gain teaching
experience, to add teaching experience to their curriculum vitaes, and
to generate income." 355 Economic motivation apparently ranks last
among these reasons. Assuming the same to be true for Yale part-
time acting instructors, an argument can be made that these Yale and
NYU TAs are not employees within the meaning of the NLRA under
the primary purpose test. However, about the UCLA TAs, some of
whom have the same duties as UCSD readers, tutors, associates, and
Yale and NYU TAs, 356 the AD said that "most individuals in these
classifications are drawn to their jobs for economic reasons." 357 Sig-
nificantly, this statement covers those UCLA TAs who, like UCSD
associates, Yale part-time acting instructors, and NYU expository
writing and foreign language instructors, teach their own courses.
358
Economic motivation apparently ranks high among the reasons why
these UCLA TAs take their jobs. Assuming the same to be true for
Yale part-time acting instructors and NYU expository writing and
foreign language instructors, an argument can also be made that
these Yale and NYU TAs are employees within the meaning of the
NLRA under the primary purpose test. In other words, a comparison
of Yale part-time acting instructors and NYU expository writing and
foreign language instructors with their counterparts at UCSD and
UCLA yields conflicting results: If these Yale and NYU TAs share
the motivation of UCSD associates, they are not employees under the
primary purpose test. On the other hand, if they share the motivation
of those UCLA associates who teach their own courses, they are em-
ployees under this test.
Overall, however, UCSD and UCLA TAs seek employment for
primarily economic rather than primarily educational reasons and
would be employees within the meaning of the NLRA under the
primary purpose test. Crucially, the same can be assumed to be true
for the similarly situated Yale and NYU TAs, who should therefore
also be granted collective bargaining rights even under this test. This
228 and accompanying text.
355. UCSD I, 22 PERC 29084, at 372.
356. Compare supra notes 258-67 and accompanying text, with supra notes
152, 154, 224, 226, 228, 308-10 and accompanying text.
357. UCLA 1, 20 PERC 27129, at 441.
358. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
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argument is, to a degree, speculative, but it rests upon the zero hy-
pothesis, namely, that Yale and NYU TAs share the motivation of
UCSD and UCLA TAs because their situation is practically the
same. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this assumption is
reasonable and the argument which is based on it is valid.
The situation is again arguably different for RAs who perform
dissertation work. The ALJ in UCLA made no specific finding as to
the reasons for which graduate students sought employment as
RAs, 359 but he stressed that "[e]mployment as a[n] [RA] meets prac-
tically every educational objective that students possess." 360 Since
more advanced RAs worked in the lab of their dissertation chair, and
often co-authored research papers with that dissertation chair, and
since these research papers may sometimes be reworked into their
dissertation,361 the RAs might have accepted these positions for pre-
dominantly educational rather than predominantly economic reasons.
If that is correct, they would not have been employees within the
meaning of the NLRA under the primary purpose test, and the same
can be assumed for those NYU RAs whom the union did not seek to
represent and who performed dissertation-related work.362 As be-
fore, the small minority of UCLA RAs whose work is not tied to
their own dissertation or course work are an exception to this conclu-
sion; this is also true for those NYU RAs whom the union sought to363
represent and who did not perform dissertation-related work. Such
RAs should be recognized as employees within the meaning of the
359. RAs are, however, covered by the AL's general remark that "[a]lmost
all student employees seek and accept student employment due to the money
they receive." UCLA , 20 PERC 27129, at 451 n.10. If the answer to the
question "would students become RAs if the work was related to their disser-
tations but uncompensated?" is indeed "no," and the answer to the question
"would students become RAs if the work was unrelated to their dissertations
but compensated?" is indeed "yes," then RAs are employees within the mean-
ing of the NLRA under the primary purpose test. Thus, it might be easier for
RAs to be classified as employees under the primary purpose test than under
the service test. Insofar as it is not desirable to classify RAs as employees, this
might be another argument against the primary purpose test and in support of
the service test.
360. Id. at 440.
361. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 155, 257, 283 and accompanying text.
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NLRA under the primary purpose test because they probably take
employment for predominantly economic rather than predominantly
educational reasons.
In conclusion, all TAs and some RAs take employment for pri-
marily economic rather than primarily educational purposes, and
they are therefore employees within the meaning of the NLRA under
the primary purpose test. Other RAs, on the other hand, take em-
ployment for primarily educational purposes and are therefore not
employees under this test.
C. Coverage of TAs Under the NLRA Will Not Violate the Public
Policies Behind the NLRA
1. Introduction
Even if TAs and RAs are employees within the meaning of the
NLRA, they might be excluded from coverage under that act on
public policy grounds. Two different types of arguments are fre-
quently raised in connection with this proposition: first, that collec-
tive bargaining over terms and conditions of TA and RA employ-
ment will infringe upon academic matters, and second, that coverage
of TAs and RAs under the NLRA will lead to increased labor unrest.
The following two subsections argue that neither of these arguments
is convincing and that coverage of TAs and RAs under the NLRA
would therefore not violate the public policies behind that act.
2. Collective bargaining over terms and conditions of
TA employment will not infringe upon academic matters
According to Yale's president Richard Levin, "there is... a di-
rect educational relationship between a student and faculty member
who serves as his or her teacher, research advisor, or supervisor in
teaching," and "interposition of a third party, whether [the TA union]
or any other, into such a relationship would ... chill, rigidify and
diminish it."'364 NYU officials are similarly concerned that "collec-
tive bargaining with graduate assistants will discourage mentoring
relationships between graduate students and their faculty
364. Yale Univ., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 1999 WL 1076116, at *14 (Nov. 29,
1999).
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advisors. 365  In addition, "NYU officials say they are most con-
cerned about the bargaining impinging on academic considerations,
like class sizes or what to teach., 366 Such concerns had been raised
already by the St. Clare's majority which worried that "[t]he inevita-
ble change in emphasis from quality education to economic concerns
which would accompany injection of collective bargaining into the
student-teacher relationship would.., prove detrimental to both la-
bor and educational policies" 367 and that "many academic freedoms"
and "other academic prerogatives" would become mandatory sub-
jects of collective bargaining. 368 These concerns were later shared
by the Boston Medical dissenters. 369 They were, however, not shared
by the Boston Medical majority, which, in granting collective bar-
gaining rights to medical house staff, stated:
The contour of collective bargaining is dynamic... : what
can be bargained about ... may change .... We need not
define here the boundaries between permissive and man-
datory subjects of bargaining concerning [house staff], and
between what can be bargained over and what cannot. We
will address these issues later, if they arise.
370
The Regional Director in New York University later asserted along
similar lines that "collective bargaining negotiations can be limited
to only those matters affecting wages, hours and other terms and
365. New York Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-22, at 31 (NLRB Apr. 3,
2000).
366. Karen W. Arenson, Union Cleared for Students Who Teach, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2000, at B1.
367. St. Clare's Hosp. and Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1002 (1977); see
also supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. According to University of
California President Richard C. Atkinson, the troubled negotiations between
that university and its TA union have "snagged" on such academic matters.
See Weiss, supra note 297, at A37; see also supra text accompanying notes
295-97. Thus, the university views union attempts to limit the number of hours
TAs can work in a single week as an "infringement on the academic judgment
of the faculty" who sometimes need their TAs to put in more hours towards the
end of the semester to help grade term papers and exams. Weiss, supra note
297, at A37; see also infra note 374.
368. St. Clare's, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1003; see also supra note 90 and accompa-
nying text.
369. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
370. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 1999 WL 1076118, at
*20 (Nov. 26, 1999) (emphasis added).
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conditions of employment [so] that the critical elements of academic
freedom need not be compromised."37'
The Boston Medical majority sought support for its argument in
state court decisions. It found such support in an extensive quote
from the California Supreme Court's Regents decision granting
medical house staff at public hospitals collective bargaining rights.
The full quote reads as follows:
The University asserts that if collective bargaining rights
were given to housestaff[,] the University's educational
mission would be undermined by requiring bargaining on
subjects which are intrinsically tied to the educational as-
pects of the residency programs. This 'doomsday cry'
seems somewhat exaggerated in light of the fact that the
University engaged in meet-and-confer sessions with em-
ployee organizations representing housestaff prior to the ef-
fective date of [the relevant statute]. Moreover, the Univer-
sity's argument is premature. The argument basically
concerns the appropriate scope of representation under the
Act. (See § 3562, subd. (q).) Such issues will undoubtedly
arise in specific factual contexts in which one side wishes to
bargain over a certain subject and the other side does not.
These scope-of-representation issues may be resolved by
the [PERB] when they arise.
372
The California PERB quoted parts of the same passage in its de-
cisions in UCSD and UCLA to grant TAs at California's public uni-
versities collective bargaining rights. 373 The PERB reasoned there
that safeguards and exclusions contained in California's HEERA
adequately addressed the university's concerns regarding the impact
of collective bargaining over terms and conditions of TA employ-
ment on academic issues.
374
371. New York Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-32.
372. Boston Med., 1999 WL 1076118, at *21 (quoting Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. PERB, 41 Cal. 3d 601, 623, 715 P.2d 590, 604-05, 224 Cal. Rptr. 631,
646 (1986)).
373. See supra notes 247, 287 and accompanying text.
374. See Association of Student Employees, 22 PERC 29084, at 354 (Cal.
Pub. Employment Relations Bd. 1998) [hereinafter UCSD 1]; Student Ass'n of
Graduate Employees, 23 PERC 30025, at 88 (Cal. Pub. Employment Rela-
tions Bd. 1998) [hereinafter UCLA 11]. University of California Assistant Vice
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The federal NLRA does not contain comparable safeguards and
exclusions. It is significant, however, that the Regents court did not
refer to HEERA's safeguards and exclusions, and thus apparently
thought that none are needed to enable the PERB to keep academic
issues out of collective bargaining over terms and conditions of
medical house staff employment.
By the same token, no statutory provisions are needed to enable
the NLRB to keep academic issues out of collective bargaining over
terms and conditions of TA and RA employment. Long before Re-
gents, UCSD, and UCLA, and Boston Medical, Yale, and New York
University, Professor Malin made a convincing argument in this re-
gard. Professor Malin observed that "concern that student unions
will misuse the collective bargaining process to the detriment of their
educational institutions ... raises issues regarding the scope of col-
lective bargaining rather than the applicability of the N.L.R.A. to
student employees." 375 He further observed that
[s]tate authorities have had little difficulty in delineating the
permissible scope of academic collective bargaining ....
[T]he appropriate agency or court may balance the impact
of [a potential bargaining] issue on the terms and conditions
of employment against the impact of the issue on matters of
educational policy to determine whether it should be a sub-
ject of mandatory collective bargaining .... A similar bal-
ancing process in private university negotiations is not in-
consistent with national labor policy. Although the
Supreme Court has upheld the NLRB's extensive interpre-
tation of the duty to bargain, it has never considered the
scope of collective bargaining for dual status employees,
e.g., employee-students.
376
A good example of how state authorities have "delineat[ed] the
permissible scope of academic collective bargaining," even without
the help of statutory safeguards such as those provided by HEERA,
President Judith Boyette implicitly recognized the importance of these statu-
tory safeguards and exclusions for limiting the scope of bargaining when she
said regarding that university's dispute with its TA union, described supra note
367, that "[u]nder state labor law.... it's clear that union contracts cannot re-
strict how professors design their courses." Weiss, supra note 297, at A37.
375. Malin, supra note 345, at 28.
376. Id. at 28-29 & n.139 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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is class size, one of the very issues about which NYU officials are
"most concerned," leading NYU Vice President Robert Berne to
claim that "[i]t is almost impossible to draw the line between what
we consider academic issues and what they consider work issues."
377
While a minority of state courts has held that in contract negotiations
between public school districts and teachers' unions, class size is a
mandatory subject of bargaining, 378 the majority of state courts has
held that it is not.379 What is important here is not the different re-
sults reached by the different state courts, but rather the fact that they
all have been able to "draw the line" somewhere with respect to class
size at public schools, contrary to the claim by NYU Vice President
Berne. By the same token, there is no reason to believe that the
NLRB will not be equally able to "draw the line" somewhere with
respect to class size at private universities. The fact that it may not
be easy to draw the latter line, or that some private universities may
not like where it will be drawn, is no more an argument to deny TAs
and RAs collective bargaining rights than the fact that it was not easy
to draw the former line-as evidenced by the split in jurisdictions-
or that the minority of public school districts does not like where it
was drawn is an argument to deny teachers these rights.
The NLRB recognized in Boston Medical that it has the power
to define the scope of collective bargaining over terms and condi-
tions of medical house staff employment in such a way that academic
matters are kept out. It could exercise its power to define the scope
of collective bargaining over terms and conditions of TA and RA
employment in a similar way. Concern over the possible intrusion of
collective bargaining upon academic matters is therefore not a valid
reason to deny TAs coverage under the NLRA.
Let us finally return to Yale President Richard Levin's worry
about the "interposition" of a TA union into the "educational rela-
tionship between a student and faculty member who serves as his or
377. Arenson, supra note 366, at B1.
378. See Tualatin Valley Bargaining Council v. Tigard Sch. Dist., 808 P.2d
101 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that class size is a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining because it relates to work load, which is itself a mandatory subject of
bargaining), rev'd, 840 P.2d 657 (Or. 1992).
379. See In re West Irondequoit Teachers Ass'n v. Helsby, 315 N.E.2d 775
(N.Y. 1974) (holding that class size is not a mandatory subject of bargaining
because it initially is purely the subject of educational policy).
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her teacher, research advisor, or supervisor in teaching."38 The re-
ality, however, is that the student-teacher and employee-supervisor
relationships are separate, often involving different faculty members
in the respective positions of teacher and supervisor. Interposition of
a TA union into the economic employee-supervisor relationship
therefore does not, as a rule, intrude upon the educational student-
teacher relationship. As the AD in UCSD I explained, "[tihe mentor
relationship . . . is limited primarily to the relationship between a
graduate student and a dissertation committee chair, or sometimes a
committee member., 381 This relationship would be unaffected by
collective bargaining because it is "extremely rare for the same indi-
viduals to have been in both an employee-supervisor relationship and
a student-faculty mentor relationship., 38 2 And in UCLA I, the AD
added, "Even if evidence indicated that a large number of mentor
relationships overlapped with employment relationships, extending
coverage would not damage those relationships. There is nothing in-
herent in collective bargaining that precludes a supervisor from being
a mentor . .,,383 Mentor issues, therefore do not militate against
NLRA coverage of TAs.
The corresponding concern by NYU officials that "collective
bargaining with [RAs] will discourage mentoring relationships be-
tween graduate students and their faculty advisors" 384 might be more
valid, at least with respect to some RAs. Recall that at UCLA, RAs
typically conduct dissertation-related research in the lab of their dis-
sertation chair, who also functions as their supervisor.385 In this case,
it will be much harder to separate the work performed as an RA from
the education obtained as a student, and the relationship with the su-
pervisor from the relationship with the dissertation chair. Conse-
quently, interposition of a union into the employment relationship
could adversely affect the mentor relationship. Concern over the
possible intrusion of collective bargaining upon academic matters
380. Yale, 1999 WL 1076116, at *14.
381. UCSD I,22 PERC 29084, at 386.
382. Id.
383. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 20 PERC 27129, at 445 (Cal. Pub. Em-
ployment Relations Bd. A.L.J. 1996) [hereinafter UCLA 1].
384. New York Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-31.
385. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
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might therefore be a valid reason to deny those RAs who work in the
lab of their advisor coverage under the NLRA. No such objection
exists in the case of TAs like those involved in Yale. Neither is it
clear that such an objection exists in the case of the RAs involved in
New York University. Recall that the union did not seek to represent
and the Regional Director did not include in the bargaining unit those
NYU RAs who, like the UCLA RAs discussed supra in this para-
graph, performed only dissertation-related research.386 Whether the
other NYU RAs which assist "a professor in his or her research
' 387
perform this service for their advisor or for another professor is un-
clear, and to the extent that they do so for a professor other than their
advisor, no mentoring relationship is implicated.
3. Coverage of TAs under the NLRA will reduce the number of
TA strikes
Yale Graduate School Dean Thomas Appelquist is concerned
that coverage of TAs under the NLRA will result in strikes.388 The
NLRA, however, states, "Experience has proved that protection by
law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively
safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption... 
that is, from strikes.389 It is thus an axiom of federal labor law that
coverage under the NLRA of employees within the meaning of the
NLRA reduces the number of strikes in general and recognition
strikes in particular.
390
Similarly, the UCLA IIPERB observed that:
HEERA's expressed purpose is to foster harmonious and
cooperative labor relations by providing for a system of
collective bargaining between the University and its em-
ployees. It is [therefore] axiomatic that this purpose is fur-
thered by the extension of collective bargaining rights to
those employees determined by PERB to meet the
386. See supra notes 156, 169 and accompanying discussion.
387. New York Univ., 66 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-25 (emphasis added);
see also supra note 155 and accompanying text.
388. See Streitz & Hunkler, supra note 5, at 371.
389. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
390. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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[HIEERA] test.
391
The California Supreme Court said in Regents that "it is widely rec-
ognized that collective bargaining is an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism which diminishes the probability that vital services will
be interrupted. ' 392 Even the dissenter on the UCSD I PERB who ar-
gued against granting TAs collective bargaining rights admitted that
"lessening the frequency of strikes is a positive feature of collective
bargaining.
'3 93
The facts seem to support the axiom that collective bargaining
minimizes labor unrest. Then-Chairman Fanning claimed in his St.
Clare's dissent that "the recent strikes at various New York City
hospitals are the direct result of [the denial of collective bargaining
rights to medical house staff in] Cedars."394 Commentator Jennifer
A. Shorb found that "[m]ost housestaff strikes are recognition
strikes." 395 This view was echoed by the UCLA I ALJ: "While
strikes among student employees in a recognized bargaining unit
have occurred as a negotiation pressure tactic.., they are rare. Most
... strikes... occur[] as a demand for recognition." 396 Yale has en-
dured three TA recognition strikes in four years, 397 hardly evidence
that denying NLRA coverage keeps TAs from striking.
Dean Appelquist, however, contends that positive experiences
with collective bargaining at public universities cannot be general-
ized to private universities because public employees, once they are
recognized as such, cannot strike.398 Dissenting Boston Medical
NLRB Member Hurtgen agrees: "The majority observes that no
problems have developed in the public sector where house staff are
involved in collective bargaining. I would remind them that these
governmental employees do not have the right to strike."
399
391. UCLA 11, 23 PERC 30025, at 87.
392. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. PERB, 41 Cal. 3d 601, 623, 715 P.2d
590, 605, 224 Cal. Rptr. 631, 646 (1986).
393. UCSD 1, 22 PERC 29084, at 361 (Johnson, Member, dissenting).
394. St. Clare's, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1009 (Fanning, Chairman, dissenting).
395. Shorb, supra note 189, at 1089.
396. UCLA I, 20 PERC 27129, at 446.
397. See supra notes 127-28, 130 and accompanying text.
398. See Streitz & Hunkler, supra note 5, at 371.
399. Boston Med., 1999 WL 1076118, at *29 (Hurtgen, Member, dissent-
ing).
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Although this is true for public employees in most states, it is not
true for public employees in California, where the supreme court has
held that "strikes by public employees are not unlawful... unless or
until it is clearly demonstrated that such a strike creates a substantial
and imminent threat to the health and safety of the public."400 It is
unlikely that a TA strike would be deemed unlawful under this de-
manding standard.40'
Since coverage under California's HEERA, like coverage under
the federal NLRA, does not prevent student employees from striking,
the Boston Medical NLRB majority was correct to infer from the
PERB's conclusion in Regents, namely that coverage under HEERA
of medical house staff would reduce rather than increase the number
of house staff strikes at California's public hospitals, that coverage
under the NLRA of medical house staff would likewise reduce rather
than increase the number of house staff strikes at the nation's private
hospitals. By the same token, the NLRB should infer from the
PERB's corresponding conclusion in UCSD and UCLA regarding
TAs, based at least in part on the same reasoning as Regents, that
coverage under the NLRA of TAs and RAs would reduce the num-
ber of TA and RA strikes at the nation's private universities. As dis-
cussed at the beginning of this section, such an inference would be
consistent with the explicit NLRA assumption that collective bar-
gaining minimizes labor unrest. Concern that coverage of TAs and
RAs under the NLRA would result in strikes is therefore not a
400. County Sanitation Dist. v. Los Angeles County Employees' Ass'n, 38
Cal. 3d 564, 586, 699 P.2d 835, 850, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424,439 (1985).
401. Applying the standard defined by the California Supreme Court in
County Sanitation, the California PERB has found even a public school teacher
strike to be unlawful only where it disrupts the educational process so as to
cause, in the words of the concurrence, a "total breakdown of education."
Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 11 PERC 18067, at 407 (Cal. Pub. Employment
Relations Bd. 1987) (Hesse, concurring). Public school education represents a
more essential public interest than public university education, and a strike of
teachers at a public school causes a more dramatic disruption of education than
a strike of TAs at a public university. In particular, since a TA strike leaves
professors free to teach their own classes (whereas a teacher strike does not
leave anyone to teach any classes), it does not cause a total breakdown of edu-
cation and should not be held to be unlawful under County Sanitation as inter-
preted by Comnpton Unified.
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valid reason to deny TAs and RAs collective bargaining rights under
the act.
V. CONCLUSION
All TAs and some RAs at America's private universities should
be granted collective bargaining rights. These assistants are employ-
ees within the meaning of the NLRA under both the old primary pur-
pose test (because they seek employment for primarily economic
reasons) and the new service test (because they provide compensated
services). Moreover, there are no valid public policy reasons to deny
these TAs and RAs coverage under the NLRA. Collective bargain-
ing over terms and conditions of TA and RA employment will not
infringe upon academic issues, and NLRA coverage will not increase
the number of TA and RA strikes. Accordingly, coverage of these
assistants under the NLRA is proper. Such a decision would not
only give hard-working TAs and RAs their due, it would have the
additional advantage of making federal labor law more consistent
with state labor law and leveling the playing field for private and
public universities. Whereas TAs and RAs at America's private uni-
versities, who are governed by federal law, currently do not have
collective bargaining rights, similarly situated student employees at
public universities in a growing number of states, who are governed
by state law, do have such rights. 40 2 Removing such arbitrary and ir-
rational distinctions between federal and state labor law and between
private and public employers and employees should be a public pol-
icy priority: Such distinctions may hinder the understanding of and
respect for the law and may disadvantage private employers or em-
ployees vis a vis their public counterparts or vice versa. Removing
such distinctions through coverage of TAs and RAs under the NLRA
therefore benefits not only those student employees, but society as a
whole.
Bernhard Wolfgang Rohrbacher*
402. See supra note 294.
* J.D. candidate, May 2001. Many thanks to Michael T. Anderson of the
law firm of Davis, Cowell & Bowe; Prof. Catherine L. Fisk of Loyola of Los
Angeles Law School; Margo A. Feinberg of the law firm of Schwartz,
Steinsapir, Dohrman & Sommers; Carl Levine of the law firm of Levy, Ratner
1916
TAs AND THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN1
& Behroozi; Julia Mass of the law firm of Rothner, Segall & Greenstone; and
the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for helpful
comments. The author alone is responsible for all mistakes.
June 2000] 1917
1918 LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 33:1849
